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( i ) 
P R E F A C E 
In this dissertation, an effort has been made to bring 
to the fore the real nature of the powers and functions of 
Heads of State in Parliamentary and Presidential democracies. 
Usages, customs, conventions, constitutional provisions have 
been cited to show the extent to which they can go, constraints 
on their powers and the punishments to which they are liable 
in case they dare to misuse their powers. 
These ultimately give an idea of the exact position held 
by the Heads of State in their respective countries. 
The annotated bibliography consists of 250 abstracts 
arranged under appropriate subject headings, which in turn are 
in an alphabetical order. Classification schemes and helpful 
sequence guided by postulates and principles are also used to 
make things easily understandable. 
The entries are arranged in the following way : 
a) Serial no, 
b) Name of author/s 
c) A full stop (,) 
d) Title of the article. Subtitle, if any 
€) A full stop (.) 
f) Title of periodical underlined 
g) Semi colon (;) 
h) Volume no 
i) A Comma (,) 
( i i ) 
j) Issue no 
k) Semi colon (;) 
1) Year in figures 
m) A comma (,) 
n) month, date 
o) Sani colon (;) 
p) Pages 
q) A full stop (.) 
Part three consists of author and title indexes. Both 
are arranged alphabetically with their respective entry 
numbers. 
The rules of ISI have been followed in this bibliography. 
I express ray thanks to Mr, Sabir Husain, Reader,Department 
of Library Science, Aligarh for his valuable suggestions, 
guidance and cooperation at each step. 
I am also thankful to Prof. Noorul Hasan, University 
Librarian and Chairman, Department of Library Science and the 
Staff of Maulana Azad Library, who have been equally helpful 
to me. 
( SEEMA RAZ ) 
PART ONE 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The Constitution of India is Parliamentary, with the 
President as its formal and the Council of Ministers as its 
real executive. Here we are concerned only with the President. 
There has been a lot of discussion as to the position 
occupied by the President of India under the constitution. 
Under article 53(1) of our Constitution, the executive power 
of the union is vested in the President, but under article 75 
there is to be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister 
at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of 
his functions. The President has thus been made a formal or 
constitutional head of the executive and the real executive 
powers are vested in the Ministers or the Cabinet. 
In the Indian Constitution, therefore, we have the same 
system of Parliamentary executive as in England, and the 
Council of Ministers consisting, as it does Of the members of 
the legislature is, like the British Cabinet, 'a hyphen which 
joins a buckle vdiich fastens the legislative part *f the state 
to the executive part'. The Cabinet enjoying, as it does, a 
majority in the legislature concentrates in itself, the virtual 
control of both legislative and executive functions; and as the 
Ministers constituting the Cabinet are presumably agreed on 
fundamentals and act on the principle of collective responsibility, 
the ntost important questions of policy are all formulated by them. 
Although the Indian President is supposed to be only 
a constitutional head like the British Monarch, its not clear 
how much power he can actually claim and to what extent he 
can safely assert himself. That makes the Presidency 'a quiescent 
voleano' which can erupt at any time. On the occasion of 
political crisis, the Presidency becomes "a bastion of great 
strategic in^ortance". 
In an emergency, the President could even legislate 
depriving all the powers of states and denying them a share 
in the income-tax and other available sources of revenue. 
He could suspend the fundamental rights and could suspend 
also the state constitution on the ground of disobedience of 
central executive direction-making power to effectuate preven-
tive detention in order to imprison his political opponents. 
As Commander-in-Chief, he can use the armed forced for the 
suppression of civil powers. By such repressive measures, he 
may even ensure the election of a House of the People which 
would support him. 
But the actual working of the Presidency in India, 
during the last 30 years, shows that the Presidents have 
exercised influence but not power. The first four Presidents 
Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Dr. Radhakrishnan, Dr. Zakir Husain and 
V.V, Giri took active part in the affairs of the state. None 
allowed himself to be reduced to the pdsition of a figure head. 
All the Presidents have differed with their respective Prime 
Ministers, at one time or the other. At times these differences 
with their Cabinets were expressed publicly and strongly. But 
when the Prime Ministers insisted on a particular course of 
action, they were allowed to do so as they thought proper 
without raising legal or constitutional difficulties in their 
way. All the Presidents confined themselves to a constructive 
role. In no case a difference was made an obstacle in the way 
of the Prime Minister. 
Dr. Prasad differed from Jawaharlal Nehru on the Hindu 
Code Bill and emergency in Kerala in 1959 apart from some other 
matters but when the Prime Minister insisted the Bill as well 
as the emergency were approved. Dr. Radhakrishnan expressed his 
sense of 'shame and humiliation' over the disaster on our 
north eastern frontiers and accused the government of gross 
mismanagement of our resources. The first non-congress Ministry 
was formed in Madhya Pradesh because Dr. Zakir Husain lent 
sympathetic ears to,the opposition leaders. Mr. V.V. Giri 
criticized the government rather strongly in 1973. While it is 
creditable for the Prime Minister^ not to turn sore when Presidentis 
aired their differences in public, its much more creditable for 
the Presidents never to think of obstructing the government 
work, when Prime Ministers insisted going their way. The working 
of the Presidency is thus quite creditable for the healthy 
growth of parliamentary institutions in India. 
All this controversy regarding the powers of the 
President was set at rest by the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976. 
Article 74 clause (i) had been substituted by a new clause 
which makes it obligatory for the President to act according 
to the advice of the Union Council of Ministers in all cases. 
Thus President no longer enjoys any real power, where he could 
ignore or go against the wishes of his Ministers, After the 
Amendment, the legal position of the President is only that of 
influence and not power. It may be added that this is exactly 
the way the various Presidents of India have actually acted 
during the last 30 years as a matter of convention. 
The 44th Amendment Act, 1978, has made one more change 
in Article 74(i) namely, that the President will have the right 
to refer back an advice tendered by the Coijncil of Ministers only 
once. This gives the President the President the right to 
send back the advice' for reconsideration, once. He is still, 
more or less, like an English Monarch, 
It may be desirable to compare the President of India 
with the American President. About the position of the President 
Dr. Ambedkar observed thus in the constituent Assembly: "In 
the Draft constitution there is placed at the head of the 
Indian Union a functionary who is called the President of the 
Union. The title of this functionary reminds me of the President 
of the United States. But beyond identity of names there is 
nothing in common between the form of government prevalent in 
America and the form of government proposed under the Draft 
constitution. The two are fundamentally different. Under the 
Presidential system ©f America, the President is the chief 
head of the Executive. The administration is vested in him. 
Under the Draft Constitution the President occupies the same 
position as the King \inder the English Constitution. He is the 
head of the state but not of the Executive. He represents the 
nation but does not rule the nation. He is the symbol of the 
nation. His place in the administration is that of a ceremonial 
device on a seal by which the nation's decisions are made 
known". 
It must be noted that the American President is the head 
of a Presidential form of government and consequently is the 
real executive. As such all real power in the government vests 
in him. His ministers are his secretaries or assistants. He 
may not take their advice. He may even dismiss them. The result 
is that all powers of the government vest in him not nominally 
but actually. The American President is the leader of the nation. 
He is elected by the people directly and is responsible to 
the people directly. The result is that he is a very strong 
person. 
According to Prof. Laski, "The American President 
symbolises the whole nation in a way that admits of no competitor 
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while he is in office. Alongside this, the.voice of a Cabinet 
officer is, at best, a wisper, which may or may not be heard". 
Again, "A decision of the Supreme Court is regarded as adverse 
to his policy; a defeat in congress is blow to his prestige; 
the mid-term congressional elections affect his policy for 
good or ill. No one thinks of them in terms of their effect 
upon his Cabinet". 
But that is not the case with the President of India, 
He is not elected by the people directly. His indirect election 
weakens his position. Moreover, the Prime Minister of India is 
the real figure in the Indian politics. It is he who is the 
leader of the nation, and the nation looks upto him for guideuice, 
This puts the Indian President into the shade. The President of 
India is expected to act always on the advice of the ministers. 
The President of India resembles the King of England 
or the President of France, The reason is not far to seek. 
In all the three cotintries, there is a parliamentary form of 
government and all the three persons are the nominal executive 
in the three countries. No wonder, they do not enjoy substan-
tial powers. 
It is pointed out that the Indian President dare not 
become a despot. He must act according to the advice of the 
ministers. If he acts against the advice of the ministers, they 
are bound to resign. Since the outgoing ministers have a majority 
in Parliament, no other set of ministers can have a majority. 
The result is that the President is faced with a situation in 
which it is difficult to run the machinery of the State, No 
President will dare to create such a constitutional deadlock. 
He knows full well that Parliament has the power to impeach 
him. The ambition of any President is bound to be cooled on 
account of the sword of Damocles always hanging over his head 
in the shape of impeachment. 
But the critics point out that an \anscrupulous President 
may succeed in establishing his dictatorship. He may not summon 
the legislature during the period of emergency. He may dismiss 
and appoint those who are entirely dependent on him. He cannot 
be inpeached during the period of emergency and before the 
emergency is over, he can destroy completely the constitutional 
machinery and thereby avoid any chance of being impeached. Its 
pointed out that such a thing happened in Germany when Hitler 
established his dictatorship under the Weimar constitution. 
The same was done by Napolean 111 in 1852, 
Its not denied that the possibilities are there, but it 
is hoped our training in Parliamentary traditions will help us 
to weather all these difficulties. 
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LIST OF PERIODICALS 
Amer Bar Assoc J - American Bar Association Journal 
Amer J Int Law - American journal of international law 
Amer J Pol Sc - American journal of Political Science 
Amer Pol Quart - American Political quarterly 
Amer Pol Sc Rev - American political science review 
Ann Amer Acad Pol Soc Sci - Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 
AS - Asian Survey 
Brit J Pol Sc - British journal of political science 
Bureaucrat - Bureaucrat 
Congress and the Presidency -
Comp Mast - Competition Master 
Daedalus 
Dialogue 
EPW - Economic and Political Weekly 
ET - Economic Times 
For Aff - Foreign Affairs 
For Pol - Foreign Policy 
Government and opposition -
GPSA 
HT - Hindustan Times 
111 Wkly Ind - Illustrated weekly of India 
Ind Quart - India Quarterly 
Ind Ty - India Today 
IE - Indian Express 
Ind J Pol - Indian journal of politics 
Ind J Pol Sc - Indian journal of political science 
Ind J Pol Stud - Indian journal of political studies 
Ind J Pub Ad - Indian journal of Public Administration 
Ind Pol Sc Rev - Indian political science review 
lYHR - Israel yearbook on Human Rights 
Internasional Politikk 
Int Stud Quart - International studies quarterly 
Jahrbuch des offentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 
J Const Pari Stud •^ Joxornal of Constitutional and 
Parliamentary studies 
J govt Pol Stud - Journal of government and political 
studies 
J Pol - Journal of politics 
J Pol Stud - Journal of political studies 
J Soc Stud St govts - Journal of the society for study 
of state governments 




Md Dy - Mid-Day 
Midwest J Pol Sc - Midwest Journal of political science 
Mod Rev - Modern Review 
Orbis 





Pol Sc Quart 
Pol Sc Rev 
Pol Stud 
Polity 
Presi Stud Quart 
Proc Acad of Pol Sc 
Pub Adm Rev 
Pub Int 
Pub Law 
Pub Opin Quart 
Quart J Adm 
Rev fol 
Round Table 
Soc Sc J 




Univ Cincinnati Law Rev 
Univ Detroit Law J 
West Pol Quart 
- People's Democracy 
- Political Quarterly 
- Political Science Quarterly 
- Political Science Review 
- Political Studies 
- Presidential Studies Quarterly 
- Proceedings of the Academy of 
Political Science 
- Public Administration Review 
- Public Interest 
- Public Law 
- Public Opinion Quarterly 
- Quarterly journal of Administration 
- Review of Politics 
- Social Science journal 
- Social Science Quarterly 
- Southern Quarterly 
- Times of India 
- University of Cincinnati Law Review 
- University of Detroit Law journal 
- Western political quarterly 
11 
Wld Aff - World Affairs 
Wld Ty - World Today 
Yale Law J - Yale Law Journal 
Yale Rev - Yale Review 
PART TWO 
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EXECUTIVE POWER PARLIAMENTMY IKDIA 
1, BAILURCMG) . President's powers: Wrong Comparison and 
conclusion. TI; 1987, Apr 14; 6:3, 
Reviews that Nehru in a speech had said that though 
President does not have any real power, his position in one 
of great authority and dignity. The fact is that the President 
is both a figurehead and figuratively, a rubber starap. There 
is nothing in the Indian constitution which says that the 
President can over rule the advice of a Prime Minister, The 
constitutional battles in British history have all been 
between crown and parliament. Some antique powers do inhere 
in the crown, like its power to wage war or to order invasion 
of a foreign country, but without Parlieanent's coiniaent, given 
year, by year, no standing array can be kept on foot. Without 
the grant of supplies, the king will have no money. Thus 
Parliament has an efficient check upon the kings action. The 
explicit written Indian constitution does not make it easy 
to harW back to British precedents every time a difficulty 
arises as conditions are seldom identical. 
2. BHASIN (Prem), Twilight of the Indian Presidency, IE; 1981; 
1:1, 
States that the Presidency has often been ignored by 
the people, the Prime Ministership being the star attraction 
in a parliamentary democracy. But even as the incumbents have 
13 
come and gone with slow majesty and seemly dignity/ the office 
of the President has become more and more politicised. The 
political xindertones have always been there - from the early 
differences between Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajendra Prasad, to 
the open clash between Nehru and Radha Krishnon; from the 
signing of the proclamation of internal emergency by Fakhruddin 
Ali Ahmad in Jtone 1975 to the dissolution of the Lok Sabha by 
Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy in August 1979, Constitutional amendments 
not withstanding, the Indian Presidency still retains its 
cutting edge - the President can refuse to give his assent to 
any bill and refer it back to parliament; or he can send 
messages to parliament which may be critical of the government 
in power. In fact he remains in full control of all his presi-
dential powers.even if he should be caught in the thick of 
impeachment proceedings, 
3, GEHLOT (NS). President: A Titular Head? Mod Rev; 133,6; 
1973 De; 421-3. 
Mentions that the framers of the constitution could not 
specify the actual position of the President, Practically the 
working of the constitution proves that he?^ s a constitutional 
head. He has certain duties to perform but strictly within the 
fo\ar corners of the constitution. He cannot be compared with 
14 
the king of England as the constitution is supreme in India 
where as in England its the parliament. The constitution itself 
ensures that the president should not be ignored. Art 78 casts 
a duty on the President to play a role in our system. 
4. INDERJIT. President has many powers. ET; 1982; Jy 13; 5:7. 
Reveals that several controversies have been resolved 
and healthy conventions built in regafd to the office of the 
President, that President could dismiss a ministry and order 
fresh election and that the power to hold elections could be 
exercised as a reserve power. Under Art 86, he can address 
either house of parliament or both together. Also he can send 
messages to either house of parliament whether with respect to 
a Bill or otiierwise. Under Art 153 he can consult the supreme 
co\irt on any question of law. President has the right to 
information and he's empowered to uphold the constitution and 
establish conventions by as"king questions. All in all He's 
not required to be a rubber stamp by the constitution. He could 
be wholly constitutional and yet act impartially, objectively 
and independently, 
5. MISRA (KP). Presidents' powers and limitations. Patriot; 
1987, Apr 30; 4:3. 
Discusses that it was made clear in the beginning itself 
that the President, under the present constitution is intended 
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merely to be a constitutional head. Dr. Ambedkar emphasized 
that the President of the Indian Union will be generally bound 
by the advice of his ministers and the non-acceptance of 
ministerial advice, would amount to violation of the constitution 
for which he could be impeached. Chapter I of Part V of the 
constitution lays down that the executive power of the Union 
shall be vested in the President but if it leads to a monoc-
rotic system, the constitution delimits his powers by providing 
that it would be exercised in accordance with the constitution, 
The constitution makes it obligatory for the Prime Minister to 
communicate to the President all decisions of the council of 
ministers. Thus, the President, has a significant role to play 
in certain situation for e,g. when the state of parties in 
Parliament is xincertain or when the constitution fails to 
function, 
6. MISRA (KP), Presidents' power in India: its nature and 
extent, Ind J Polit Sci; ?3. 2; Apr-Je 1962; 168-78. 
Describes that there has been a lot of controversy 
regarding the Presidents' speech about his constitutional 
position vis-a-vis his ministers at New Delhi (29.11,1960). 
Constitutionally, Presidents' position is quite clear, it 
seems; the basic principles of government in India are cabinet-
Parliamentary not Presidential Executive. This was the inten-
tion of the Founding fathers; this is the view which judicial 
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opinion supports; and the practice recognized in conventions 
of the constitution. Ministerial advice is binding on the 
President, He's not in_significant and can assume an important 
role as a unifying forces in times of crises and change. What 
is needed isi not an amendment to the constitution but a new 
understanding of its principles, 
7. MORAL.AUTHORITY. Ind Ty; 1987; Jl; 11. 
The controversy between the President and the Prime 
Minister has raised the question of what precise powers and 
responsibilities the president has under the constitution. If 
the president is not meant to be a rubber stamp he's not meant 
to be an alternative centre of power either. In essence, the 
President has to be a source of m4ral authority, accepted and 
respected nationally because of his persona, and the dignity 
and impartiality with which he applies his mind to affairs of 
states, it should not be forgotten that the constitutions 
original design cannot be preserved if the men in higher office 
do not measure up to the trust placed in them, 
8. MR PRESIDENT (editorial). Statesman; 1977, 27 Jl; 6:2. 
Reviews that when the office of the President was 
conceived by the constituent Assembly, it was more than a 
17 
decorative post. Its upto the president to give the government 
of the day wise counsel, to warn it of the pitfalls of parti-
cular policies and be the elder statesman who, while remaining 
in the background, can steer that government away from dangerous 
ventxires. Besides, this President must remain above partisan 
politics, 
9. PATNAIR. (SR), Indian President: re-considered, J Polit Studs 
8,1; 1975; 70-6. 
Reviews that the recent apprehensions of presidential 
dictatorship in an unsettled political atmosphere are cottpletely 
ruled out. Such a change could be brought about either by 
peaceful or forceful means. Forceful changes are backed up by 
the military power. The Indian President, thoughs supreme 
commander of armed forces would find it difficult to have the 
unconditional support of the army, because of the size of the 
country, traditions etc. For peaceful change the President 
is equally handicapped. Being the superfluous part of an other-
wise split executive, he can never hope to rival even a weak 
Prime Minister without creating an inpression that he is 
better suited to deliver the goods. For such a mass contact 
he has no opportunity, 
10, PRESIDENT CAN act independently. TI; 1987, Mr 22; 7:1, 
Discusses that the Presidents* position is analogous 
to that of a governor of a state who was not bound to da 
18 
everything a cabinet asked him to do. President can act 
without seeking the advice of the Central Cabinet by calling 
upon the government to provide him information on affairs of 
state and other relevant matters. The President, therefore, 
enjoyed powers and authority to send back a decision for 
reconsideration either to the Central Cabinet or the PM. Thus 
the President could use his powers by calling for all infor-
mation to carry out his constitutional functions. 
11. PRESIDENT'S POVJERS. Statesman; 1969, Ag 11; 3:3. 
States that various kinds of interpretations have been 
provided as regards the prerogatives of the president. In the 
conflict with PM Nehru, President Rajendra Prasad emphasized 
that the Indian President was not like a British Monarch because 
no limitations had been mentioned in the constitution. Had 
there been any, there would have been an article like 105 where 
the Bfitish precedent was cited as the basis of powers, 
privileges of Members of Paliament to govern the office of 
president. Since the Presidents* position is analogous to that 
of a British monarch, it would be constitutionally improper 
for the President not to seek or not to be guided by the advice 
of his ministers. By art 74(l) the President is required to 
act in all matters with the advice of his council of ministers. 
19 
Parliament was elected by the people and council of ministers 
were ^ hetnparliaraent. Hence power was with them and not with 
the president. 
12. RAJAMANI (AN). Powers of the President. ET; 1969; Je 15; 
5:3. 
Discusses that as regards the position of the Council 
of ministers in relation to the president, the latter cannot 
carry on the administration of the country without the advice 
of the council. This appears questionable as there is no 
provision in the constitution empowering the president to 
exercise any function in his discretion, nor is there any provision 
requiring him to act only in accordance with ministerial advice. 
In terms of Art 74, no court is entitled to invalidate any act 
of the president on the ground that he has not taken ministerial 
advice. The only sanction is his moral obligation and thus 
he's entitled to reject the advice of the council, 
13. RAKGACHARI (DV). President's role: A matter of form and 
substance. Statesman; 1976, 20 Oct; 4:4. 
Describes that in the constituent Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar 
observxed that like the English King, our President will not only 
have three rights but also the prerogative powers of appointing 
the prime minister and dissolving the House. Its' always been 
20 
accepted by constitutional experts that whether or not its 
made explicit, no President can afford to antagonize his 
council of ministers. Art 74 in its present form added status 
to the President without adding to his power. While accepting 
the British model for the powers of the head of the state, 
the only way by which constitution makers could confer prestige 
and dignity to the office was to refrain from proclaiming 
through statute : that the president was a figurehead. 
14. RAO (KV). Presidential address at the 29th Indian Political 
Science Conference; Role of the President. Ind J Pol Sc; 
29, 1968; 6-7. 
States that President is one who enjoys the confidence 
of not only the centre but also of the state governments. It's 
not a constitutionally valid proposition that the president 
is only a nominal head, he gets some powers as a result of the 
political realities, when at the centre no party could claim 
an absolute majority. He's supposed to be an impartial head 
of the state. Even if he is a party man, his powers are clear 
and limited to the prerogatives of the king of England. 
21 
15. RASHEED TALIB. Moot points, HT; 1969, 17 Ag; 1:1. 
States that despite structural differences, the Indian 
constitution is modelled largely on the British Cabinet system 
of government. Indian president, is not hereditary but elected 
that too indirectly by an electoral college. He's capable of 
bearing some of the powers that derive ultimately from the 
sovereign will of.the people. His position is half way between 
king's in UK and the US President's. The article of the 
constitution are fairly clear as regards of the president and 
the PM. Just as the country cannot be without a president so 
too the president cannot function without a Prime Minister. In 
fact Indian President's position is some what more flexible 
then the British Monarch's, 
16. SAHAY (S) . Close Loolc; The role of the President. Statesman? 
1984; 6:4. 
Discusses that as far as the strict constitutional 
position goes, where the choice of chief minister is concerned, 
the governor has absolute discretion and he cannot be dictated 
to by the centre. By the same token, should Mrs, Gandhi decide 
to hold elections after January - the President, will be within 
his rights not necessarily to allow her to form a caretaker 
government, but to opt for some others MP. It's admitted that 
the President is bound by the advice of his council of ministers, 
22 
but once the Lok Sabha has been automatically dissolved, 
accountability disappears and the president is free fo assert 
himself. Concludes by saying that under our constitution, the 
President has ordinarily to sign on the dotted line, bgt does 
have a role to play in abnormal times, 
17, SHARMA (SR), President of India. J Polit Stud; 3,1; Feb 1970; 
43-
Discusses that India set up a parliamentary government 
under its constitution. It's no slur to say that this was an 
attempt to copy the working of the British parliament and put 
a president in place of the British monarch India has, however, 
departed slightly from the model, before it. The constitution 
set up a sovereign democratic republic. It's a Republic because 
an elected President is the head of the states. It's worth 
while trying to determine his place in the government. 
18. SHARMA (BAV)and VfiLECHA (NM). Indian president. Polit Quart; 
33,1; Jan-Mar 1962; 59-73. 
Gives an account of a discussion that has been going on 
regarding the exect position of the President in the Indian 
constitution. The questions raised are whether the president is 
analogous to the British crown in that he is a titular head of 
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the Executive or that the President is endowed with enormous 
powers and that the only limitation upon the President is the 
constitution itself. The debate centres upon whether a constit-
utional amendment is necessary to clarify by definition the 
precise nature of the Presidential powers, 
19. SIWACH (JR). Indian Presidency. Pol Sc Rev 11; 1972; 250-4. 
States that the president is not bound by the advice 
of his council of ministers and that there is a vast area of 
powers and functions in which he may act in his discretion and 
may indeed exercise his individual judgement and these include 
such matters such as the appointment of the Prime Minister, 
dismissal of the council of ministers, summoning of the Parliament, 
vetoing of bills etc. Discusses further that even if one of 
the political parties has a clear majority in the House of 
people, it's not the council of ministers alone which can give 
a threat of resignation, the president may also do the some. 
But it does not take into account the resulting constitutional 
crisis which should deter the president in all circumstances 
to disregard or defy his council of ministers. 
AMENDMENTS 42 & 44 
20, JHA (Prem Shankar). President and the Prime Minister. HT; 
1987, Mr 19; 9:3. 
Describes that the aJrbiguities begin right from the 
24 
framing of the constitution. The 42ncl and 44th amendments show 
the extent to which the position of the president had deviated 
from that envisaged in the constitution. Its the"^  PM who decides 
the method by which the president is to be kept informed and 
if in exceptional cases the PM chooses not to inform the 
president of his action. He's not violating the spirit of the 
constitution. He's the one who can claim legitimately to 
exercise the power of the people on their behalf and not the 
President of India. 
21, MIDHA (Tenia) and REHMAN (M). Limited options. Ind Ty; 1987, 
Feb; 36-7, 
Describes that the powers of a President in case of a 
difference of opinion are confined to requesting the government 
to reconsider its decision. The constitution in its Articles 
74 and 111 leaves no doubt in this respect. And if, there was 
any doubt at all during the framing of the constitution, the 
42nd Amendment passed during the Emergency made it explicit by 
stating: "There shall be a Council of Ministers with the prime 
minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, 
in the exercise of his function, act in accordance with such 
advice". Admittedly, the President operates within a tight 
strait jacket, but with his oath of office, binding him to 
25 
"preserve, protect and defend the constitution", he has to follow 
the rules . Any move to enhance his powers in this respect would 
imply granting -veto powers. So beyond exercising the mere 
nuisance value of postponement conferred on him by the constitution, 
there is only one alternative left for the President: To step 
down, A paradoxical predicament for a constitutional head who 
has the powers to appoint the prime minister and even dismiss 
governments which have lost the confidence of the House. 
22. NAGPAL (RC), President and Prime Minister. lEf 1977, 
15 Mr; 4:7. 
States that right from the beginning there has been a 
controversy over the constitutional position of the prime minister 
and the president. The PM undoubtedly enjoys a pre-eminent 
position in the Council of ministers. Ministers are appointed 
on his advice Art 75(1). If any minister disagrees he must 
resign or face dismissal, entire council is dissolved with this 
resignation and he's the one who coitmunicates to the president, 
decision of the council. At the same time being the head he 
cannot be taken for the whole body and President has all the 
power to refuse to act on his lowe advice even after 42nd 
amendment. There are a few areaSwhere President can use his 
discretion. Since he's not responsible to anybody under the 
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constitution, therefore he should abide by the advice of the 
council which is responsible 42nd amendment can be utilized 
by any PM to impose his personal dictatorship. 
ARTICLES 53,74,77(3),78, 86 
23. MUKHERJEE iCAK) . Constitutional powers of the President and 
Prime Minister. Statesman; 1969, 21 Jl; 8:4. 
Describes that the office of the President of India 
was intended by the constitution makers to be more on the 
British pattern than US. The Indian President does not seem 
to have been endowed with substantial powers of his own. He 
can act only on the advice of the Prime Minister. Art. 53 vests 
the-executive powers of the union in the President who exercises 
it either directly ofc through officers subordinate to hi»r«.The 
constitution and the law are binding on him. Its mandatory 
for the President xinder Art 77(3), to make rule for the govt, 
and for the allocation anrang ministers of the said business. 
Art 74 provides that the President is to act on the coxancil 
of ministers advice which shall not be inquired into in any 
court. The right to advice a dissolution of the House of People 
is an effective instrximent of political discipline in the hands 
of the Prime Minister, The constitution makers preferred to put 
a check on the prime minister by Presidential discretion. 
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24. MULGAOKAR (S). PreisdBUt and PM: As we were. IE; 1987, 
Mr 31; 1:1. 
Discusses that the PM has been accused by the President 
of misleading both houses of parliament in the matter of his 
constitutional duty unambiguously defined in Art 78 of the 
constitution. To this the PM replied that its to the parliament 
that he owes a duty to clarify his position. With holding of 
information en important state issues had been the main reason 
for the differences between the two dignitaries. 
25. NAYAR (Kuldip). PM Zail Seek legal advice. Md Dy; 1987, 
Apr 12; 1-2, 
Describes that advice on the interpretations of Art 78 
and 86 of the constitution was sought from the Attorney General 
of India abd the Solicitor General, PM was of the view that 
he had the right towwithhold certain information and that he 
wasn't obliged to disclose everything to the President, who 
on the other hand thought that it was PM's duty under Art 78 
to do so. As regards Art 86, president contention was that 
he can sends any message to parliament to which PM held that 
the assent of the council of ministers is necessary. However, 
the exact situation is that under Art 78, it's the duty of the 
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PM to conmunicate all decisions of the council of ministers 
to the President and to furnish such information as the president 
may call for. Under Art 86, the president has the right to 
address either House of Parliament or both houses together and 
may send messages and the concerned house shall consider any 
matter required by the message to be taken into consideration. 
BILLS 
26. DAHIYA (MS). Presidents power to assent intbebills in India. 
Mod Rev; 130, 20; Feb, 1972; 122-33. 
States that the power to assent to the Bills, which is 
given generally to the constitutional Head in a democratic set 
up, has become a matter of utmost, importance in the Indian 
political system. The problem is bound to arise because the 
language of the constitution gives a large amount of discretion 
to the President to be used in this connection. 
CABINET OFFICERS 
27, BHASIN (Lalit). PM can withhold information. OT; 1987, My 23. 
States that our constitution has been drafted on the 
basis of parliamentary form of democracy which itself signifies 
that parliament is supreme. Both the President and the PM are 
accountable to parliament and through parliament to the people. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Art 78, its open to the 
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PM and his council to withhold any information concerning the 
administration of the affairs of the country from the president, 
if the pararaoxint interests of the states so require. The 
president cannot claim any right superior to that of parliament 
or the judiciary. The right of the president to seek information 
from the PM has to be qualified right and not an unfettered 
one. After the 42nd and 44th amendment, it was made clear that 
the advice of the cotancil shall be binding on the president, 
COMPARISON UK 
28, CHAWLA (Prabhu), Asserting supremacy. Ind Ty; Feb 1987; 
34-5. 
Mentions that presidents and Prime Ministers have crossed 
swords with each other in the past too. But none of these was 
as serious as the one between the first president and the 
first prime minister over the Hindu code BiSbl. Both of them 
were trying to establish their supremacy and Nehru even quoted 
British parliamentary conventions to assert his view. But the 
English conventions are not confined only to the»»»anner in which 
the president should exercise his manners. There are a ntomber 
of other conventions which are equally well established in 
England which limit the power of parliament itslef in the 
exercise of its legislative functions, 
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29. JAIN (Girilal). President's obligations: Constitutions 
and conventions. TI; 1987, Apr 1; 6:3. 
Describes that Indian President do not enjoy any special 
powers and his position is comparable to that of the British 
monarch. British crown does have some powers like the power 
to dismiss the PM despite his majority in the House of commons 
if the crown has enough reason to believe that the Hoxise no 
longer represents the sense of the electorate or even in 
cases of emer^ncy arising as a result of the \infitness of 
the ministry. But in reality the crown has never sought to 
interfere in the governance of the country. India has had in 
Mr. Reddy a President who could stand upto a PM and put some 
one of his choice but has not had one who could corppete with 
the PM for popular support. The balance of the power has been 
titled so heavily in favour of PMs that no president whatever 
his inteirpretatlon of the constitution, has been in a position 
effectively to challenge a PM. Democracy requires on the part 
of elected rulers, the deepest request for certain norms and 
conventions and well established constitutional arrangements. 
CONSTITUTION 
30. BANERJEE (DN). Indian Presidency. Link; 10,5; 1967 sep; 
20-1. 
States that its been 37 years since our constitution 
came into practice and some people still hold wrong notions 
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about the powers of the President, Our President is titular 
chief executive, whereas the Council of Ministers at the centre, 
with the Prime Minister at its head constitutes the real central 
executive. The president stands immune from criticism, challen-
ge and from dispute. Responsibility criticism, danger of 
dismissal are all transferred to the Prime Minister. Its not 
within the constitutional competence of the President to 
dictate what should be the form of our government at the centre 
or how the government should be carried on. There is no room, 
in fact in our constitutional system for an active and inter-
fering president. 
31, DAS (Sitanshu). President - PM relations. HT; 1987, Jl 30; 
9:3. 
Reveals that of the several deficiencies in India's 
presidency, the one concerning the president - PM working 
relationship demands close examination. In UK, the PM in 
normal times has a weekly audience with the Queen. In India 
PM meets the president infrequently. India's written constituion, 
having attempted a more precise definition of the presidential 
powers caniiDt be equated with the unwritten conventions that 
guide the British crown's position. The British model cannot 
work in India, if the president tries to establish a dyarchy. 
The president is not the one who receives and investigates the 
complaints against the PM. The constitution does not provide 
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for such a role of the presidency. The electorate, parliament 
and press are there to punish the PM for his/her blunders, 
32. HEAD OF State & head of government, (editorial). Comp mast; 
1987, Apr; 635. 
States that under the constitution (Part V), the Prime 
Minister is required to keep the president in regular touch 
with the developments but Mr, Gandhi by disregarding relevant 
provisions, has not observed the constitutional norms. Although 
he claims that he had been briefing the president regularly 
but such occasions have been few and far between. The president 
of India is supposed to be a rubber stamp yet it would not be 
proper for him to i>ut his signature on a measure which seeks 
to serve party rather than national interests i.e. He has to 
take deep interest in political happenings without actually 
intruding into politics. 
33, KALLENBACH (JE). Presidency and the constitution: A look 
ahead. Law and Contemporary Problems; 35,5; 1970, 445-60. 
States that revision of any part of the constitution 
current provisions relating to the office of president is not 
likely to occur in the near future, except for adoption of 
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some form of direct popular election plan In place of the 
present electoral vote-indirect popular election system. Various 
revisions of the present constitutions language outling the 
presidents powers and relationships with congress will continue 
to be urged from some quarters, but without success. Changes in 
these relationships may occur, however* through utilization by 
congress currently available devices and procedures calculated 
to give it a larger share of responsibility in policy making, 
34, LAN (JN)• Relations between Indian President and Prime 
Minister. Mod Rev; 128, 1; Jan 1971; 47-55, 
States that in order to know the correct relationship 
between the two high offices, one has to look at the various 
constitutional provisions having a bearing on their relation-
ship and to analyse various extra-constitutional factors 
which guide the relationship in practice. The fact is that 
both the president and the prime minister have their own 
different sources of strength. Both offices are linked in a 
system of checks and balance within the framework of the const-
itution. Each has sufficient power to check the other from 
abusing his power and authority. On the other hand, both have 
been made inter-dependent. Neither can do without the support 
of the other, 
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35. MADHU LIMAYE. Don't prorogue Parliament. HT; 1987, My 16. 
Reveals that both in Britain and in India, its the 
ministers who really rule and the queen and the president give 
them advice or occasionally warn them. There cannot be 
President's rule at the centre. The President has only three 
prerogatives. (1) to appoint a Prime Minister, (2) to dismiss 
a PM and (3) to return a bill to parliament. In India these 
are derived from constitutional provisiftns and the last power 
is not absolute. Coming to (1) the president in 1984 violated 
the established rule by calling upon Rajiv Gandhi to form an 
administration as he was neither the elected leader of the 
majority party nor a member of the cabinet. The discretionary 
power (2) is also limited. As long as the PM enjoys the support 
of the majority in the Lok Sabha, President cannot think of 
dismissing him. Since under the present, conditions, Rajiv 
enjoys support of the majority in Parliament, it would be 
better if Parliament is neither adjourned nor prorogued but 
kept in continuing session and discussion be allowed \ander 
Art 78 and rule 184, and the question of Art 78 and defence 
deals be referred to a special parliamentary committee. 
36. MASANI (Minoo). Roots of President - PM clash. TI; 1987, 
Mr 29; 1. 
Discusses that the fundamentaa> problem of the powers 
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and functions of the president which lies at the root of the 
present controversy was carefully considered by the constituent 
Assembly and its members decided to depart from the British 
pre^dent by having a written constitution which gave the 
president powers in excess of what the British sovereign enjoyed 
under Britain's unwritten constitution. The President, thus 
created was half way between the British crown and the US 
president/ not of course the head of the government as in the 
USA under the presidential system, but certainly not a 
puppet or a figurehead. 
37. MATHUR (RN). Problem of revision of the Indian constitution. 
Ind J Pol Sc? V 31; 1920, 368-9. 
Reveals that so far as the text of the constitution is 
concerned, there is no mandatory provisions to compel the 
president to act according to the advice of the ministers and 
there is no provision requiring the president to act only 
under the coxjmter signatxure of a minister. The President himself 
is authorized to a make rules (Art 77(2)) as to how his orders 
and instruments are to be authenticated. He is boxind to assert 
his powers to maintain stability of government as he has taken 
an oath, to protect and preserve the constitution. 
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38. NO CASE for privilege charge against PM. JEj 1787, 
Mr 21; 1:2. 
Describes that the Rajya Sabha Chairman Mr. Venkataraman 
did not allow any discussion on the exchange of letters between 
the PM and the president. In terms of the constitution, the 
office of the President was to enjoy a special relationship 
with the council of ministers headed by the PM, The constitution 
provided for a cabinet form of government with president as 
head of the state and PM as head of the government. The 
peoples will was embodied in parliament which expressed itself 
through cabinet. The cabinet transacted its business in the 
name of the president. Under the conventions of the constitution, 
President has the right to encourage, warn and advice the council 
and in order to prevent his office from getting discredited 
at times, it was essential that the confidentiality of commun-
ication between the PM and the President was maintained. 
39. NO CONVENTION flouted: PniE; 1987, Mr 3; 1:1. 
Describes that the Prime Minister did not agree with 
the charge th«at the government violated established convention 
by not taking the president into confidence on issues of 
national importance. Mr. Gandhi maintained that his government 
had not violated Art 74 and that his ministers had been meeting 
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the President constantly and consulting him on national issues. 
There was not a time when such issues were kept away from the 
President. 
40. NOORANI (AG). President, PM and Parliament. IE; 1987, Mr 25. 
States that one way of enforcing the rules of parliamentary 
government, as suggested by Dr. Ambedkar, was to leave the 
matter to the legislature itself and to see whether by a 
censure motion or a motion of non-confidence, it cannot compel 
the ministry to give proper advice to the president and 
impeachment to see that the president follows the advice. Inst-
rument of instructions for the guidance of the president was 
later dropped and the provisions of the constitution were adopted 
on the understanding that the conventions would be followed, 
Its not open to the president or the PM to ignore them only 
because instrument was deleted. Its the duty of the parliament 
to see that the conventions of the system are followed. For 
the duties of PM as respects furnishing of informations to the 
President, Art 78 is to be considered and not conventions. In 
fact this is the situation facing us today. The PM twice 
claimed that there has never been any failure to keep the 
President informed on matters of national interest. But the 
Presidents' letter reveals as prima facie case of violation 
of Art 78, contradicting the claim. 
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41. NOORANI (AG). Presidents' right to know. IE; 1987, Apr 24? 
12:3. 
States that while much of the relationship between the 
Pjresldent and the Pri«e Minister is governed by the convention 
of the parliamentary system, some of these have been written 
into the text of the constitutions. Art 78 which lays down 
specific duties in respect of a specified individual. Its 
perfectly consistent with Art 78 to say that the President acts 
on the K4s advice but He's entitled to full information. 
Dr. Ambedkar held the view that the President enjoys some 
prerogatives of his own as distinct from his functions. The 
Prime Minister is the real executive head and what he initially 
sends to the President is for him to decide but onee the 
President asks for information under Art 78(b) the rule precludes 
refusal to supply when asked for. 
42. PRASAD (Anirudh). Study of the principle of "aid and advice" 
in Indian constitutional perspective. J Const Pari Stud? 
10,3; 1976, 272-95. 
Reviews that the Indian constitution adopted a compromise 
version of the "aid and advice" principle (of the government 
to the president), between the compulsory nature of the principle 
and the non-compulsory natxire of it. Thus;" the Indian principle 
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•\-ineither the carbon copy of the British parliamentary system 
nor the American Presidential system. Its a peculiar mixture 
of both systems and employs a suigeneris principle of "aid and 
advice". India needs its own principle, in conformity to its 
ovm special requirements, 
43, PRESIDENT AND the Prime Minister, (editorial), Ftle; 
1987, My 16; 9. 
Reveals that the Presidents' letter did not approve of 
the PMs statement that he had been keeping him (President) 
informed of the affairs of state. Art 78Xb) enjoins on the 
Prime Minister to furnish such information relating to the 
administration of the affairs of the union as desired by the 
President. But the governments stand is that the President is 
bound on all matters by the advice of the council of ministers 
and he can seek from the PM only that type of information,the 
council advices him to seek. Had this been so, the President 
would have been reduced to a rubber stamp. Although right to 
be informed is necessary for the caution that can be provided 
to the government, yet this right is not unlimited. He cannot 
use this right to enlarge his constitutional role and to run 
a parallel administration, 
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44. PRESIDENT NOT conviced. Statesman. 1987, 8 My; 1:5. 
Mentions that the President Zall Singh originally 
communicated to Mr. Gandhi that under Art 78 of the constitu-
tion he should be kept informed by the latter of all state 
matters and that the Prime Minister had not been doing so right 
from the beginning. Prime Minister, on the other hand, contended 
that the President is not entitled to any more information on 
state matters then the government thinks it fit to disclose 
to him and that the government has already fulfilled the 
constitutional obligation under Art 78 regarding the information 
to be given to the president. Thus, there is a renewed confron-
tation between the president and the prime minister that 
presages a crisis in the Indian political system of unprecedented 
magnitude. 
45. POWERS OF President under constitutions. HT; 1960, Nv 29; 
1:4. 
Reveals that while delivering a speech on the occasion 
of laying a foundation stone. Dr. Rajendra Prasad raised the 
question of the powers and functions 6f the President. The 
Indian constitution is based largely on the model of the British 
constitution with some obvious differences. British constitution 
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is a \initary constitution whereas India has a federal constitu-
tion, The head of state in Britain is a monarch, in India, He 
is an elected President who holds office for a term and can be 
removed for misconduct. The executive power of the union is 
vested in the president. There are in the articles of the 
constitution many provisions which lay down specific duties 
and function of the President but there is no provision which 
clearly indicates that the president shall be bound to act in 
accordance with the advice of the council of ministers. 
46. RAY (A), Coalition politics and constitutional heads in 
India. J Const Pari Stud? 5,2; Apr-Se; 1971, 238-44. 
Reveals that the principal role of the constitutional 
heads of India is to act as communicator and balancer in the 
working governmental structure, A necessary condition of their 
effective role performance is that the style of their decision 
making should reflect an adequate awareness of the principle 
of constitutional propriety. The President of India has always 
allowed himself to be dictated by the advice of council of 
ministers. Their effect has been the negation or abridgement 
of the agreement evolved by the constituted Assembly on the 
role of constitutional heads in India. 
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47. SHOURIE (Arun). Yet another way. IE; 1987, Mr 31; 1:1. 
States that Art 86(2) vests in the President the right 
to send messages to either houses of the parliament. The article 
does not lay dovm that the president can send his message only 
with the concurrence of the council of ministers. Under our 
constitution, the president is not only the fount of the 
executive. He's also an integral part of the parliament and no 
part of Parliament is bound to obey the advice of the council 
of ministers. The essence of the parliamentary government is 
that all the ministers are accountable to parliament and not 
the other way round, 
48. SORABJEE (Soli J), Sage Coun^illcJr, a friend. TI? 1987, 
My 17; 1, 
Mentions that the President is not constitutionally 
equibed to remove the government that enjoys the confidence 
of the House, neither can he do so thinking that the government 
can no more represent the wishes of the electorate because in 
ft large number of cases he would not be in a position to arrive 
at such decision with conviction. Any misjudgement on his part 
would be bad not only for himself but for the presidency as 
well as this might lead the people to think of Presidency as 
having become a game in the hands of contending political 
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factions. In fact he cannot dismiss a duly elected government 
on the ground of incapability, unfitness or even corruption as 
he does not possess any disciplinary jurisdiction. 
49. SORABJEE (Soli J). Heresies about the constitution. T^; 
1987, My 6; 6:7. 
Reviews the fact that the Indian president is only a 
constitutional head and the real executive powers are vested 
in the council of ministers, cannot be disputed. But that does 
not make the President a mere rubber stamp. Under Art 74 
president is not permitted to go against the ministerial advice 
but this not an absolute principle of universal application. Its 
Just a general rule which can be displaced by the compulsions 
of exceptional situations. The President can neither be forced 
to resign, nor removed by having recourse to Art 70, Finally, 
the successful working of constitution depends only on the 
mutual trust between the head of state and the head of the 
government. 
50, SURI (Surinder). Presidential Prime Minister: New trend in 
Indian politics. TI; 1985, 8. 
Describes that in following the Westminster model, the 
Indian constitution separated the practical political respons-
ibilities of the head of government from the symbolic and 
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ceremonial functions of the head of state. This delinking is 
important for several reasons. Any government must take unpopular 
decisions or commit mistakes; these may turn a substantial 
section of the citizens against it. But opposition to the 
government is to be distinguished from loyalty to the state. 
Performance of ceremonial functions implies that the person 
concerned is above politics and controversies; this cannot be 
the case with a political leader in a democratic society. If 
the holder of a symbolic office •«/acts the rites, its a 
different matter, for they do not possess political power. But 
for those who wield power ceremonies may even be concocted in 
the expectation of drawing material advantages. At the consti-
tutional level, the distinction between the office of Prime 
Minister and the President has tended to become somewhat 
blurred. While on paper India maintains the parliamentary 
framework, in reality, the prime minister not only functions 
like a president but is also not subject to the constraints 
of the presidential system. 
51. SV Towards a Showdown, Mainstream; Mr 1987; 1-2. 
Discusses that the Prime Minister had made a bland 
statement that at no time or on any occasion had constitutional 
provisions been violated and that he himself and his ministers 
had kept the President fully briefed on issues of national 
importance and maintained that the office of the President has 
not only faulted the PM for breaching. Well established 
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practices and conventions and "even cortstitutlonal provisions 
regarding furnishing of information to the President". The 
President holds a special position and the institutional relat-
ionship between the Head of State and Head of government has 
been well defined by the constitutions. The President's rights 
and prerogatives can be flouted only at the cost of departing 
from constitutional proprieties. 
52. TEWARI (KK). Pirst blood. Ill Wkly Ind; 1987, Mr 8; 20. 
Describes that even after the final settlement of the 
areas of operation of the President and limitations of his powers, 
there has been a rift between the Prime Minister and the 
President. The President, as is well known is a symbol of the 
republic and both theoretically and in practice,his office 
has to be kept above all conflicts. In the latest constitutional 
amendment, the limits of the Presidential powers have been 
defined and it has been made clear that the president has to 
accept the decisions of the government, 
53. TOOL AND a rubber stamp (editorial). TO; 10,35; S« 1974;5€_?1. 
1. 
Describes that the office of the President as envisaged 
in the constitution is different from both the President of USA 
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and Monarch of UK«. He's neither the supreme authority in the 
Executive branch of the administration nor the constitutional 
head of the state having to do in actual administtation. The 
President of India can play a decisive role in times of cr±sis. 
Conflicts did break out between Nehru and Prasad, Radhakrishnon 
too, asserted himself at the time of crisis arising out of the 
Sino-Indian conflict. The further deepening of the economic and 
political crisis in a country gave a new dimension to the role 
that can be played by the President if he has differences with 
the PM. 
54. MEHTA (Manju). Presidents' or puppets. EPW 9,29; 20 Jl 1974 
Reviews that the position of the president as described 
by the constituent assembly was - "President in consultation 
with the cabinet". Dr. Ambedkar defined the President as "the 
head of the state and not of the executive". Conventions did 
develop but they have all tended to make the President an 
instrument of the Prime Minister and cabinet. The President's 
capacity for action is very limited and even in this limited 
field his influence can only be indirect - depending on his 
personal relationship with the Prime Minister. 
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
55. SORABJEE (Soli J), Can the President act on his own? TEt 
1987, Apr 8; 8:7. 
Discusses that initially Dr. Ambedkar's view that "the 
Presidents' place in the administration is that of a ceremonial 
device on a seal was not shared by all the members. The const-
ituent Assembly debates do indicate that the principal architects 
of our constitution accepted the position that the President 
would be a constitutional head, would have no individual powers 
and was obliged to act on the advice of the cabinet. The union 
constitution committee rejected the proposal of conferring 
discretionary powers on the president in some matters of national 
importance and decided that the president should have no special 
powers vested personally in him. The Drafting Committee maintained 
that if a bill is passed for the second time by the Houses with 
or without an amendment and presented to the President for 
assent, he shall not withhold it, with regard to the enactment 
of law, the will of parliament must ultimately prevail. 
Consequently, unless the presidents' message pertains to matters 
which fell within the exceptional category, he cannot act 
independently. 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
56. BHANDARI (Hem Lall). Beleagured Institution. Law Magazine; 
Ag 1987; 13-6. 
States that the President of India combines in him the 
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constitutional characteristics of the US President and the 
Queen of England. Right from its inception, Indian Pregqdency 
hasiBvoked an intense constitutional debate vis-a-vis the powers 
of the council of ministers. The 24th amendment reduced the 
president to a mere rubber stamp leaving no room for the president 
to exercise his independent judgement even in certain unfore-
seen constitutional crisis. Supreme Court in its ruling held 
that although the actual exercise of the functions entrusted 
to him by law is carried on by his appointed mentors i,e, the 
PM and his colleagues, the President too is vested with a 
pervasive role. The constitutional obligations of the PM and 
the President towards each other and the constitution are 
goverend by Articles 51A(a), 60, 74, 75 and 78, Art 51A{a) 
casts a duty on every citizen of India to abide by the consti-
tution and respect its ideals and institutions and If the 
holders of these hi^h offices act contrary to the provisions 
the very sanctity of the offices gets eroded. 
57. CONTROVERSIES: A common feature. Ind Ty; 1987, Feb; 38-9. 
Discusses that controversies between the President and 
the Prime Minister have not been all that rare. Of the seven 
previous presidents, only Dr. Zakir Husain and Pakhruddin Ali 
Ahmad, left office without any public confrontation with the 
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prime minister. Others, however, did challenge the authority 
of the prime minister. Dr. Rajendra Prasad had many constitution 
al run-ins with Nehru and Dr. Radhalcrishnon even succeeded 
in getting defence minister Krishna Menon sacked after India's 
debacle at the hands of the Chinese. President Giri often 
expressed his reservations over anti-labour legislation. He 
also registered his protest over the supression of supreme court 
judges,But he never publicised his differences. Matters hardly 
improved when Janata Party installed Sanjiva Reddy. The two 
leaders could not get along and Desai prevented Mr. Reddy from 
going abroad on ceremonial visits, Mr, Reddy made constitutional 
History when he invited Charan Singh to form a government, 
after Mr. Desai lost his majority in Lok Sabha. Reddy's battles 
with the Prime Minister resumed, even when Mrs. Gandhi came 
into power. Once again it was the question of foreign visits. 
Sadly enough, for the third tiiae. President Zail Singh had 
been prevented by the Prime Minister from crossing the nation's 
shores. 
58. KATYAL (KK). To unwind the knots. Ft Le; 1987, 23-4. 
Discusses that due to the unsavoury controversy over 
their relationship. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's meeting 
with President Zail Singh aroused unusual interest, as their 
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differences initially confined to temperamental incompatability 
had acquired constitutional overtones. The points made by the 
President in his Mr % letter to the Prime Minister were, 
"Constitutional provisions regarding furnishing information 
have not been consistently followed" and that he was not kept 
informed on important matters. A peep into the past is instru-
ctive because of the current developnents. Over the Hindu code 
Bill, Prime Minister Nehru was of the view that President does 
not have the right to reconsider the principles of a bill 
submitted to him for assent. President Rajendra Prasad, on the 
other hand, held that even if the bill was passed and referred 
to President for assent, he should be able to send it back to 
parliament for reconsideration, as the provisions of the 
constitution are very clear - An occasion can arise when the 
President can act independently in his own discretion. This 
was an important constitutional matter on which the two were 
involved in a serious controversy, 
59. NC Signs of disquiet. Mainstream; My 1987; 1-2, 
Describes that the President has been continuously 
ignored by the PM who never cared to extend to the President 
the courtesies and considerations that our Prime Minister in 
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the past always extended to the Head of State. There were 
never sharp differences in outlook and over policies between 
the PMs of the day and the Presidents whether it was Rajendra 
Prasad, V.V, Giri or anyone else, but no PM let the President 
fell that he was being humiliated. The PM has been accused 
for not meeting the President for months together and for not 
keeping him posted with the thinking of the government. There 
is a certain amount of ambiguity in Art 78 which relates to 
the duties of the PM with regard to the furnishing of information 
to the President. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
60. BHATT (Girish). Vital role of customs and conventions. 
ET; 1970, Se 11; 7:3. 
Describes that usages, conventions, customs play a 
vital role in any system of government. Those who argue that 
President in India cannot be expected to be guided by the 
law of convention seems to be unaware of the democratic 
experiment in the conduct of human affairs that are taking 
place elsewhere in the world. Art 74 does not make it obligatory 
upon the President to accept the advice of the council. But 
art 75(3) states that council of ministers shall be collectively 
responsible to House of People thereby making it imperative 
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for the President, to accept the advice. A joint construction 
of Art 74(1) and 75(3) makes it obligatory for the President 
to accept the advice of the council. So long as a Prime Minister 
has a requisite majority, any attempt by a president to rule 
the country will result into a constitutional deadlock, 
61. BHATTACHARJEA (Ajit). New role for successor. HT; 1969, 
6 Mr 7:4. 
Describes that first three Presidenti reinforced the 
impression that, "He has been a symbol, not a reality". Although 
Dr, Prasad differed with the government on occasions but he 
did not make an issue of it. Regarding his role at a time of 
political uncertainties, the constitution is vague and experts 
disagree on the extent of his personal discretion, A Prime 
Minister may refuse to resign even after losing the support 
of his party or after his ministry loses parliamentary majority, 
President, who has the duty to preserve, protect and defend 
the constitution can not but have a role to play in such 
circumstances. He must make legitimate use of his positions a.-nci. 
authority to protect the constitution against those who could 
subvert it for personal gains, 
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62. CHATTERJEE (Dilip K). Presidents' Rule and Union State 
relations in India. J Const Pari Stud 14,4; 1980; 330-39. 
Describes that the constitutional scheme that emerged 
in India in Nov 1949 was characterized by a strong inbuilt 
military bias. This centralism was accentuated and consolidated 
through constitutional practice and various extra constitutional 
forces and usages in the political process. One such apparent 
operative factor was the frequent and indiscriminate use of 
the emergency provision in Art 356 seeking to dislodge state 
government, mostly belonging to non congress political parties 
and impose Presidents rule in order to perpetuate the dominance 
of the congress party and central government. 
CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY 
63. BHATT (Girish). FrxiJBtless polemics on ambiguities, ET; 
1970, Se 10; 5:3. 
Describes that Indian President occupies the same 
position as the King under the English constitution. He's 
head of the state but not of the executive. He represents 
the nation but does not rule it. His place in the administration 
is that of a ceremonial device on a seal by which the nations 
discussions are made known. Clause 53(3)b contains a latent 
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check upon the wayward tendencies of a President who would 
try to assume dictatorial powers. Art 73 reveals that even 
though the executive powers is with the President, it's the 
PM, who exercises it in actual practice. Art 70 emphasizes 
the formal nature of his office. If a President acts in an 
unconstitutional manner, the full force of art 70 will come 
into play. 
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
64, JAIN (HM). Right of dissolution. Mainstream; 1970, 
Ja 17; 15-7. 
Discusses that Article 85(2) of the Indian constitution 
provides that "The President may from time to time dissolve 
the House of the People". Art 74(1) lays down "There shall be 
a covuicil of ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to 
aid and advice the President in the exercise of his functions". 
It follows thus that the President may dissolve the House of 
the People only with the aid and advice of the PM and not 
otherwise. But the words "aid and advice" do not make it 
obligatory for the President to abide by the advice of the 
Prime Minister. 
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65. JAIN (HM) . Presidential prerogatives londer the constitutions. 
J Const Pari Stud; 142, 1978; 170-86. 
Describes that Indian constitution requires the President 
to exercise his powers, in accordance with the advice of the 
council of ministers. The president is still left with one 
area of discretion in the matter of the appointment and dismissal 
of the PM and to a limited degree, the dissolutions of the 
Lok Sabha. There are no formal, constitutional provisions against 
the abuse of these Presidential powers, and therefore all 
restraint rests with the president. 
66. JHA (Nalini Kant). Indian President: Head of State or 
figurehead. Mainstream; 1987, Jl 18; 29-31. 
Discusses that the president can become a dictotbtgoing 
by soiiie of the constitutional provisions ( Art 53(1), 79, 
75(1) (2) (3) ). But in essence these reveal the constitutional 
limitations under which the president has to exercise his 
powers. First of all, he must exercise these powers according 
to the constitution; the violation of which leads to his 
impeachment. Next the executive powers shall be exercised by 
him in accordance with the advice of the council. Even before 
the 42nd amendment the binding nature of Prime Ministerial 
advice was established. In fact, after the 44th amendment 
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Act except in few cases it was made clear that the President, 
shall have no power to act at his own discretion. The actual 
ftonctioning of our political system also show that the balance 
of power is heavily titled towards the PM, Thus the centre of 
power in our constitutional structure is the cabinet headed by 
the PM, If the Pm is found violating the constitution he can 
be warned by the President but its the duty of the Pttrliaraetit 
to see that the PM functions within the constitution. 
67. MARKANDAN (KC). Office of the President of the Indian Union: 
A probe into the intentions of the founding fathers, 
J Gownst Pari Stud 3; 1969; 64-75. 
States that under the scheme of constitution as well as 
under its written word, the President is bound by the advice 
tender&d by the council of ministers so long as the latter 
enjoys the confidence of Parliament, more particularly of the 
lower house, 
ELECTION 
68. BALKRISHNA. Election of the President of India. J Con^Pari 
Stud; 7,3; 1973; 33-50. 
Describes that by giving the elected members of the 
council of states the right of vote at the presidential election, 
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the constitution makers have jeopardised the realisation of 
their intention to secure parity between the states on the 
one hand and the union on the other. 
69. SRIVASTAVA (VN). President of India: election and office. 
Ind J Pol Set 39(2); 1978; 250-69. 
Reveals that a thorough review of electoral procedures 
and republican principles shows that Indian democracy must 
develop the office of the Presidency away from partisan 
politics and towards a symbol of national union At the 
moment this process is underway and responds to the desires 
of Indias* founding fathers who were anxious to have a 
President as impartial and non-J)arty oriented as possible. 
EMERGENCY 
70, DAS (BC). Emergency provisions in the Indian Constitution: 
A study in conparative analysis, Ind J Pol Sc; 38,2; 1977; 
237-52. 
.Describes that the President makes an emergency 
proclamation, if He's satisfied, and parliament determines 
its duration. A national or financial emergency may be the 
whole of India or part thereof, A national emergency comes 
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due to war, external aggression and internal disturbance. The 
term president is understood as the Cabinet responsible to the 
Lok Sabha. Executive power is magnified during emergency. The 
constitution relies on the President to deliver the goods, 
71, DUA (Bhagwan D). Presidential rule in India: A study oin 
crisis politics, AS; 19, 6; 1979; 611-26, 
Describes that a systematic analysis of about 56 cases 
of presidential rule imposed by the federal government (under 
Art 356 of the constitution) to suspend or dissolve state 
government-in-crisis between 1950 and 1977 leads to two 
conclusions: (a) that in the majority of the cases presidential 
rule has been used for partisan reasons and that the 1977 use 
of this instrument by the Janata Center followed the pattern 
established by the Congress Center and (b) that Mrs, Gandhi 
used presidential rule not only for partisan reasons But also 
for personal reasons with a view to liquidating dissent against 
her autocratic rule, 
72, GENOVESE (Michael A), Democratic theory and the emergency 
powers of the President, Presi Stud Quart; 9,3; Jun 1979; 
283-89. 
States that the relationship between democratic theory 
and the powers of the President during emergency periods is 
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explored. During an emergency, the democratic theorists 
suggest, that in an effort to handle the crisis, governments 
should abandon democracy and accept strong despotic rule by 
the executive. This makes for difficulties when attempting 
to control the crisis presidency and possible abuses of power. 
The conclusion seeks to reconcile the need for strong execu-
tive leadership in crisis periods, with attempts to make the 
executive more accountable to democratic procedures. 
73. INDERJIT. Has the President any power? ET; 1977; My 17^ 
8:4. 
Reveals that as regards the proclamation of emergency 
in 1975, the President could have changed the course of history, 
if only he had escaped signing it at the instance of PM. 
This gives rise to the question - Does he have any right or 
has he been reduced to the position of a mere rubber stamp 
by the 42nd amendment? Doubts in regard to the precise powers 
of the President were raised initially by the first President 
of India. To which the then Attomfcen replied that he like a 
constitutional monarch could exert his influence in other 
ways like he cannot dismiss a minister but can get rid of a 
ministry. However, there should not be any doubts about the 
functions of the President in the best interest of so young a 
democracy. 
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74. IN PARTIAL emergency (editorial). Statesman; 1971, 24 De; 
8:2. 
Describes that under Art 352 of the constitution, the 
President may issue a proclamation of Emergency if he's satis-
fied that there's a threat - "whether by war and external 
aggression or internal disturbance either to the security 
of India or to that of any part of thb territory thereof". The 
constituent Assembly, while recognizing that the threat might 
be to a part of the country only made no explicit provision 
for a proclamation of emergency to extend only to a part of 
it. There was, thus an alternative procedure under Art 356 
by which the president might assume any or all of the functions 
of a state if satisfied that government could not otherwise be 
carried on, 
75. KAPUR (JL). Emergency powers of the President under the 
Indian constitution. Jahrbuch des offentllchen Rechts der 
Geqenwart? 1976; 417-58. 
The President may proclaim an emergency when the security 
of India is threatened by war or external aggression or internal 
disturbance. The proclamation remains in force for two months' 
xinless, in the meantime, approved by the two. Houses of 
parliament. Provision is also made for cases where the lower 
House has been dissolved. The satisfaction of the president 
cannot be questioned in any court. 
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76. SHANKER (V). In an Emergency. Hf; 1969; 17 Ag; 1:1. 
Describes that constitution has clothed the President 
with powers to declare emergency of different types as a 
safeguard against the breakdown of the constitutional mechinery. 
But under Art 53 he cannot step outside the constitution in the 
exercise of his functions. Constitution does not designate 
him as the Head of the Republic of India. He does not have 
residuary powers nor is he the fountainhead of specific powers. 
On the other hand, the Prime Minister is not the repository 
of powers of governance that rest only in council of ministers. 
He derives his powers under the rules of business among the 
members of council which the President is empowered to 
|>romulgate. He's bound by the advice only as a matter of 
convention, though there is no provision under the constitution 
to do so. He's a functionary under the constitution who cannot 
be ignored more so when the country is as-sailed by political 
uncertainty or large scale threat to law and order. 
IMPEACHMENT 
77. CHATURVEDI (Madhukar Shayaman). Impeachment under Indian 
constitution. J Const Pari Stud 14,2; Apr 1780; 179-94. 
Describes that the President can be impeached for 
violation of constitution which does not imply disagreement 
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from the party in power. The charge preferred by either house 
has to be investigated by theother with right of represent-
ations to the president. Impeachment proceedings enjoy immunity 
from process of courts, A strong president can escape impeachment 
by dissolving the Lok Sabha or calling in aid the defence forces 
if they support him as supreme commander, 
78. DAHIYA (MS). Impeachment of the Indian President and its 
implications. Ind J Pol 6,1; Jan-Je, 1972; 77-86. 
Discusses that the makers of the constitution knew, 
perhaps, of the possible misuse of powers by the President; 
therefore the parliament was given the right to impeach the 
president who can be impeached on one ground only-violation 
of the constitution. Constituent Assembly was of the view that 
if the President consistently refused to act upon the advice 
of the council of ministers he would be liable to impeachment 
for the violation of the constitution. Though the provisions 
of the constitution do not bind the President but the general 
philosophy of the parliamentary democracy demands that conven-
tionally the advice of the council in obligatory on the part 
of the president. 
79. DAS (BC). Impeachment of India's President: A study of the 
Procedure. J Const Pari Stud; 5,2; Apr 1971; 245-50. 
Mentions that India's president like his American 
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counterpart can be impeached by parliament for violation of the 
constitution under Art 61 and 56(i) of the constitution of India, 
Either house can prefer the charges, the other House investi-
gates or causes investigation by a judicial commission or the 
Supreme Court. Passing of a resolution by a majority of not 
less than two thirds of the total membership of the House 
results in impeachment of the President. The procedure is likely 
to be political^character, 
80. LAL (JN)and SINGH (OP). Constitutional provisions for the 
impeachment of the President of India, Mod Rev; 134, 9; 
1974 Se; 216-21. 
Describes that the President's being the highest office 
is provided by the constitution wide powers. Although he's 
not expected to misuse his powers but he might do so sometimes. 
Therefore, some checks have been provided in the form of 
impeachment against any misuse of the powers, showing thereby 
that he's not above law. These provisions, however, have some 
inherent weaknesses, which unless removed, cannot have an 
Effective check On president. 
LIMITATIONS 
8.1. MADHU LIMAYE. Powers are limited. HT; 1987; My 15. 
Reveals that recent happenings have led to an intense 
discussion on the relations between the president and prime 
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Minister, A number of interpretations and the proceedings of 
the constituent Assembly are being quoted to prove that the 
President has only limited powers. It was decided in 1947 that 
the president should not have special responsibilities so 
there was to be no clause about the exercise of any function 
by the president in his discretion. Under a parliamentary 
system the responsibility of presidential executive is both 
continuing as well as periodic. It was made quite clear that 
the president will never be able to act independently of the 
Ministers, India has adopted more or less the position of the 
British Monarch for the President and it was contended that the 
conventions under which in England the King acts always on the 
advice of his ministers will be established in India toOand the 
president, not so much on account of the written worXd in the 
constitution, but as a result of this convention, will become 
a constitutional president in all matters, 
ORDINANCE 
82. DAHIYA (MS), President's power to promulgate ordinance 
in India, Mod Rev; 139, 3; Mr 1972; 215-25, 
Discusses the powers of the President to promulgate 
ordinance, a practice inherited from the British regime, is 
considered by now a negative mechanism used often for the 
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convenience of the executive regardless of the welfare of the 
people. The mechanism of Art 123 of the constitution dealing 
with this power is analyzed and judged as a negation of 
parliamentary democracy, the government misusing it when 
its afraid of facing the legislature. 
83, RAJ (Hans). Three decades of Ordinances, J Const Pari Stud; 
14, 4; 1980; 391-428. 
Discusses that since independence about 400 ordinances 
have been promulgated in India by the President. However, for 
over three decades, no guide lines have yet been formulated 
and no criteria have been fixed for justifying the promulgation 
of an ordinance. Moreover, its not clear where there can be 
any such guidelines or criteria laid down in view of knowing 
whether power is being misused or is likely to be misused, 
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM 
84. KASHYAP (SC). On a Presidential system for India: Some 
random thoughts and considerations. J Polit Stud; 1,1; 
Sep 1969; 58-68. 
Describes its postulated that the system that the 
constitution of India laid down for the country is not the 
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parliamentary system of the British type or the presidential 
system of the American type. Its' a compromise between the 
two and a compromise which depending on the interpretation, 
really leaSns heavily towards the presidential type. What is 
needed is a re-interpretation of the constitution and consid-
erations as to how to work it afresh so as to give it greater 
and better meaning, 
85, SINGH (Mahendra Prasad). Presidential system for India, 
A note on the recent rethinking. J Const Pari Stud; 14, 1; 
1980; Ja-Mr; 1-6. 
Discusses that the presidential system, by giving the 
president more centralized executive power and the pretense 
of a national constituency, can facilitate the emergency type 
authoritarian intervention in national politics. It is notable 
that the emergency was preceded by a strong trend of personal-
ization and centralization of power. The parliamentary system 
cannot rule out such authoritarian intervention, but it will 
make them relatively less likely. 
RAJENDRA PRASAD 
86, MADHU Limaye: Rajendra Prasad's absurd pretensions. TI? 
1987; Apr 30; 6:7, 
Describes that the parliamentary executives in 
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constitutional states, have two persons holding two different 
offices. The actual governance is left to the council of 
ministers, while the head of the state is largely respSnsible 
for carrying out ceremonial functions. Although it was stated 
in the constituent Assembly that the advice tendered by the 
Cabinet would be binding on the President in the exercise of 
all his functions, yet Dr. Prasad was»i'quite satisfied with the 
interpretation and made«j* attempt to widen the area of preside-
ntial power. He made quite a issue out of the process of 
presidential election wanting the involvement of legislative 
assemblies only and that would have meant the representation 
of states twice over. 
RELATIONS WITH THE PM 
87. VENKATACHAR (CS). Relations between the Indian President 
and the Prime Minister. India Quart; 27, 2; Apr-Je 1971; 
103-13. 
Describes that the restrictive influences exercised on 
the relations between the Indian President and the PM are 
analyzed from 1950 to 1962. On the personal level, the two 
widely differing but rich personalities of Rajendra Prasad 
and Nehru excluded the sharing of ideas between the two on 
the institutional level, the links between the two remained in 
a ill-defined state. 
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RIGHT TO INFORMATION 
88, CHAWLA (Prabhu). Unresolved Controversy. Ind Ty; 1987; 
Apr 45; 26-8, 
Reveals that while disagreeing over the role of the 
President, Mr. Gandhi and President Zail Singh both quoted 
the constitution frequently in order to support their respective 
views. While the Prime Minister was of the view that he was not 
bound by the constitution to send information on all matters 
to the President, latter was of the opinion that the government 
could not deny him information on any subject if he asked for 
it. Art 78(A) lays down - "It shall be theduty of the Prime 
Minister to contnunicate to the President all decisions of the 
council of ministers relating to the administration". Art 78(B)-
"It shall be the duty of the Prime Minister to fxirnish such 
information relating to the administration of the Union and 
proposals for legislations as the President teay call for". 
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Art 86 goes as such - The President has the right to send 
messages to the two houses because without the President, 
the Parliament is not complete". Art 74 states that the 
President is to exercise his functions on the aid and advice 
of the Prime Minister. Inspite of these specific, articles, the 
problem between the twocould not be solved. 
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89. JAIN (Girilal), Dangerous plea to President: Subverting 
Indian democracy. TI^ ; 1987, Apr 15; 6:3. 
Explains that the entire scheme of the constitution is 
weighted in favour of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis the President 
Art 78 that has figured prominently in the recent discussion 
of the PM*s obligation to keep the President informed of his 
governments* decisions does not confer on the latter, the 
power to dismiss the former. In the context of Art 74, its 
been made obligatory for the President to be guided by the 
advice of the council of ministers headed by the PM, The President 
is not within his constitutional rights to disregard a PM's 
majority in the Lok Sabha and dismiss him. Its an altogether 
different matter if a PM loses his/her majority and refuses 
to resign. The Indian constitution does not provide for the 
kind of checks and balances like the US constitution. Ours is 
heavily weighted in favoxir of the executive though some 
restraints on its power are built into the constitutional 
arrangement, 
90. KATYAL (KK). Widening estrangement. Ft le; 1987, My 16; 4-7. 
Discusses that there have been a number of differences 
over Art 74 and 78 of the constitution governing the relation-
ship between the President and the Prime Minister. The two 
persons in two highest offices have put forward conflicting 
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vievrs on the two provisions, Mr. Gandhi was of the view that 
the Presidents' right to call for information is limited by 
the advice of the council which could decide what information 
should be supplied and when. But the President disagreed and 
maintained that his right to seek information was unfettered. 
In a parliamentary democracy, the real power is vested in the 
PM who is accountable to Lok Sabha. At the same time the makers 
of the constitution wanted the President in a position to influ-
ence the cotincil using his discretion advice and suggestions 
and in that context he's entitled to be fully informed of the 
affairs of the union. 
91, KRISHNA IYER (VR). President and information. Mainstream; 
My 1987; 9-10. 
Discusses that like the king of England, the Indian 
President has the right to be consulted, to encourage* and to 
warn. Acting on ministerial advice does not necessarily mean 
immediate acceptance of the Ministry's first thoughts. The 
President can state all his objections to any proposed course 
of action and ask his ministers to reconsider the matter. Its 
only in the last resort that he must accept their firjal advice. 
The Presidents' power to call for information is central to 
his function under the constitution. The demand for information 
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is a feedback needed to fulfill his office as counsellor 
exercising a commanding influence, Inspite of the vast range 
of functions and prerogatives, the fact cannot be ignored that 
in reality the Rashtrapati reigns and the cabinet rules. These 
functions necessiate a continually operative relationship with 
his Prime Minister. 
92. PM SENDS reply to President^' letter. IE; 1987, Mr-18; 1:2. 
States that President Zail Singh in his letter to the 
PM had given several examples relating to the visits of the 
latter to foreign countries, matters regarding to states and 
reports of commissions of inquiry on which he had not been 
briefed. He laid stress on need for adhering to well established 
conventions and constitutional provisions on relations between 
the President and the PM. Prime Minister on the other hand, 
violated his stand, in his reply to the President, that the 
government had always consulted the President on issues of 
national importance. 
93. POLITICAL CRISIS in the offing. Statesman; 1987, Mr 15; 1:1, 
Mentions that the President in a letter to Mr. Gandhi 
had asked him to prove his assertions that he has been keeping 
the president informed of all important state matters in terms 
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of the constitutional provisions as well as conventions 
followed by all previous PMs in their relation with the 
President and Which the PM had not been doing. PMs contention 
that he had been briefing the President on all important 
matters had been denied by the President thus leaving a wide 
commtinication gap between the two, 
94. PRESIDENT - PM: War of nerves. Comp Mast; 1987, Je; 781. 
Describes that each trying to assert this constitutional 
position, the tussle between the two continues. In a letter to 
Mr. Gandhi, President Zail Singh asked for various details of 
national events. But governments claim that he had been duly 
informed and that the constitutional obligations have been 
fulfilled, did not satisfy him. its aaid that the President 
has been trying to widen the scope of his powers and neittber-
preted the constitution as never before, 
95, PRESIDENT STUDYING PM*s reply. Statesman; 1987, Mr 19; 1:2. 
States that replying to the Presidents' letter, Mr, Gandhi 
pointed out that the government had kept him as well informed 
about national affairs as possible. He further said that it was 
not possible for any Head of Government to keep the President 
informed of day-to-day developments but the Head of State had 
73 
been briefed on all decisions. President was given a full 
report on the Ptanjab, Assam and Mizoram accords and constitu-
tional obligations were fully met. Even on the day of the 
Union Budget the Prime Minister had reported to the President 
on thelsToad parameters of the Finance Bill. A constant exchange 
of information was always there through other channels like 
members of the council of ministers meeting and briefing the 
President, 
96. SINGHVI (LM). Right to information. HT; 1987, My 19. 
Reviews that an analysis of our constitutional system 
shows that the Presidents' primary function is to act in 
accordance with the advice of the cabinet subject to certain 
well established conventional exception. He may warn, counsel 
or caution the PM but he must adhere to a high standard of 
political neutrality. His right to call for information is 
limited and subject to exigencies of his functions in the 
discharge of which he's not wholly his own master. Parliamentary 
government is essentially a Prime Ministerial government and 
the office of the President is not meant to be an adversary as 
against the vast constitutional powers of the Prime Minister. 
Constitutionally no presxamption of enlarged Presidential powers 
to impair the effective parts of our executive and legislative 
can be countenanced. 
74 
97. SOHONI (SV). Keeping the President informed. Patriot; 1987, 
Apr 10; 4:3. 
States -that the President of the Indian Union functions 
as a symbol of the dignity and integrity of the nation. Art 53 
vests all the power of the iinion in the president. But since 
in practice. President exercise no authority in his personal 
capacity. He's provided corresponding protection under Art 361 
and shall not be answerable to any court in respect of any 
proceeding, civil or criminal during his term of office. In 
a parliamentary democracy the Prime Minister has to function 
in a political environment whereas the President is obliged 
to be both a political and above the plane of political 
activity due to the symbolic status of the office of the 
President. 
98. KATYAL (KK)and RAM (N). In conversation with Zail Singh. 
Ft le; 1987, Jl 25; 22-3. 
Reveals that the President expressed his conviction that 
the stand he made on Art 78 of the constitution, relating to 
the Presidents' right to information is soxond and that the 
PM and the coxincil of ministers have been absolutely wrong. 
He made it clear that the position taken by the PM and the 
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that the cotmcil could determine what information the President 
could ask for under Art 78 is constitutionally absiird. The PM 
had violated the constitution in not keeping him informed on 
the various matters on which he had a constitutional right to 
information includlhg detailed documentation. And the council 
in taking the position it did in a resolution which was 
uncalled for had also violated the constitution. 
99. ZAIL CHALLENGES PM's statesments. IE; 1987, Mr 13; 1:5. 
Reviews that in statement in Lok Sabha, the PM Mr.Gandhi 
asserted his view that the Art 74 which provides for consult-
ation between the PM and the President had not been violated 
and he along with his ministers had been seeing the President 
regularly. President in his reply challenged the statement of 
the PM and stated that the factual position is quite different 
and the well established practices, besides express provisions 
of the constitution have not been followed, 
100. ZAIL SINGH puts an end to controversy. Statesman; 1987; 
My 24; 7:1. 
Describes that the President has finally decided to 
end the controversy over Art 78 under which he claims to have 
the unfettered rights to ask for and get the information on 
important state matters. The Prime Minister ia his letter had 
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disagreed with the Presidents* view that he had unrestricted 
right to get information from the government. However, the 
President made it clear that he had no intention of pursuing 
the matter fvirther and ended the controversy on a note of 
disagreement, 
SUPREME COURT 
101, CAN THE President send a message? IE; 1987, Mr 29; 9:1, 
Discusses that the Article 86 (2) confers on the President 
the right to send messages to parliaments either house and the 
one to which its sent shall consider any matter required by 
the message to be taken into consideration. Supreme court held 
the contention that the President cannot use - his individual 
indiscretion, must be guided by the council and that he's 
govern^by the Art 74 of the constitution even in the matter of 
sending messages to the parliament. The president is entrusted 
with powers and duties covering a wide range by the constitution 
and if he's to use discretion in every such function,parliam-
entary democracy will not be able to function smoothly. Besides 
there will be two parallel authorities exercising powers of 
governance of the country as in dyarchy days. 
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102. SINGHVI (LM). Power rests in Cabinet. HT; 1987, My 18. 
. Mentions that the President is the symbol of our republic, 
but the precedence and the dignity of his office are largely 
ceremonial. The repository of actual power is the Cabinet in 
our system. President has no special powers vested personally 
in him. He can do nothing contrary to the advice of the council 
of ministers. Presidential refusal to accept ministerial advice 
would amount to violation of the constitution. The constitut-
ional controversy on the scope of presidential powers came to 
be settled by the supreme court. The narrow area of Presidential 
discretion was enumerated as follows: the choice of PM provided 
he commands a majority in the House of People, dismissal of a 
government, having lost its majority but refusing to quit 
office and the dissolution of the house where an appeal to the 
country is necessitious although in this area the Head of State 
should avoid getting involved in politics and must be advised 
by his PM who will eventually t€^ t^^ ''t;^ ,4:i^ P9nsibility for the 
%^^^, .^^^^y ISRAEL 
103. BRACHA (Beruch). Constitutional position, the pardoning 
power and other powers of the President of the State of 
Israel. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 9; 1979; 190-224. 
Mentions that section 1 of the Basic Law; The President 
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of the state provides that "a President shall stand at the head 
of the state". The State of Israel is a parliamentary democracy. 
In Israel the President of the State is not the head of the 
Executive Branch. The President, symbolizes the states. His 
fiinctions are representative, ceremonial and symbolic. However, 
the President has almost no real power, 
UNITED KINGDOM ANALYSIS 
104. BRAZIER (Rodney). Choosing a Prime Minister. Pub Law; 
1982; 395-417. 
Discusses that the way in which a PM may be chosen need 
fresh examination. Questions concerning minority or coalition 
governments and who should head them also have to be reconsid-
ered. The conclusion from this analysis is that although the 
sovereigns role in these matters remains largely ceremonial, 
the political changes mentioned have produced a nxomber of 
political situations in which the sovereigns personal prerogative 
might in the future be needed to resolve political crisis, 
POLITICAL CONVENTIONS 
105. ALEXANDER (A). British politics and the Royal prerogative 
of appointment since 1945, Pari Aff; 23, 3; 1970; 248-57. 
Discusses that the introduction of the concept of the 
party responsibility has divested the last remaining personal 
prerogative of the crown of its discretionary element; the 
79 
only prerogative which now remains is the Royal prerogative of 
advice. Since 1945 the erosion of the discretionary powers of 
the crown has proceeded to the extent that the monarchy must 
now be regarded as a dignified part of the system. The recent 
developnent have served to strengthen the monarchy and ensure 
its continued existence; nothing is more likely to bring about 
the abolition of a constitutional monarchy than its continued 
involvement in party politics, 
FRANCE 
106. KAMINSKI (EBZ). French chief executive and foreign policy, 
S Int Yr hk For Pol Stud; 3; 1975; 51-84. 
Describes that the French President has been under much 
less constraint then the American Chief executive in regard to 
bureaucratic politics/ parliamentary obstruction, criticism 
and exposure by the media and this comparison applies even 
more to foreign affairs than to domestic policy. Nor Is the 
French President dependent upon the Prime Minister for policy 
formulation. The presidential staff makes sure that presidential 
wishes are respected and that the President is kept fully 
informed. Multiple advocacy of diverse foreign policies, so 
often suggested as a remedy for deficiencies in American 
foreign policy formulation seems incompetible with the structure 
of the French bureaucracy, 
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EXECUTIVE POWSR-PRESIDENTIAL-MEDICO 
107. HALL (Linda B). Mexican presidentialism from Diaz to 
Echeverria: An interpretive study. Soc Sci J; 17, 1; 
Ja 1980; 41-52, 
Describes that Echeverria's major break with the tradi-
tion of Mexican presidentialism, was that, rather than aparating 
as an arbiter between the groups that make up Mexican society, 
he operated as if he had \anlimited power. In contrast Portillo 
seems to be moving back to the Mexican presidential role of 
arbitrating between factions rather than attempting to impose 
presidential solutions. 
UNITED STATES 
108. ABRAHAM {HH). Presidency at the threshold of the last 
quarter of the centtiry. Southern Quart; 15,3; Apr 1977; 
231-44. 
States that the history of the US has been characterized 
by a persistent and continuous contest among the three separated 
branches of government. The balance of power among them has been 
upset by a problematical fact of our governmental life: a swollen 
presidency of excessive duties and exercise of powers. Reflec-
ting upon this, the basic question becomes how to properly 
reduce ^he swollen presidency. There is simply no question that 
the times in which we live demonstrably necessiate a strong 
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assertive presidency; one that is capable of meeting the omni 
present and ennipotent challenges of enduring crises in national 
and international affairs. Yet much can and must be done to 
harness the aberrent, sometimes criminal, exercises of power of 
the modern presidency if our remarkable constitutional system 
is to endure e.g. Senate confiirmation of top presidential 
assistants. 
109. AGBEDE (10). Idea of an Executive President. Quart J Adm; 
11, 4; Jly 1977; 227-40. 
States that an idea of an Executive President as contained 
in the Draft constitution represents a significant departure 
from the previous constitutional arrangements as contained in 
the constitution. Specifically, it replaces a constitutional 
Head of State with a political leader. It confers executive 
power solely on an individual. In their endeavour to elevate 
a person to the positions of a ruler, the CDC has fashioned 
for the nation a President with a ti^ht grip on the legislature 
and with some significant influence over the judiciary. Doubtless 
the Presidential system has a greater potential to produce an 
effective government then the Westminster model and may be more 
conductive to the prevailing circumstances of an emergent 
nation, nevertheless, the Executive President needs not be as 
all powerful as fashioned by the CDC. 
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110, AIKIN (C), Question of Executive primacy: Thoughts on 
American experiences. Jahrjbuch aee Qff^ntlichen Rechts 
der Geqenwart; 15, 1966; 1-8, 
Reviews that its difficult to prove that powers exercised 
by political executives are necessarily superior to those of 
legislatures, A sxirvey of the role of the president of the US 
shows that he can and will direct the exercise of massive 
power; its nevertheless clear that he faces limits on his 
exercise of power that are unknown in either Great Britain 
or France. 
111. ANISUZZAMAN (Mohammad) and KHAN (Mohammed Mohabbat), 
Presidential power: A view from the president-advisors 
interaction process. Ind Pol Sci Rev; 12,1; Jan 1978; 
88-106. 
States that in the President advisor interaction process 
US Presidents tend to appoint as advisors men whose ideas 
coincide with their own, a practice which might limit discussion 
to policy alternatives similar with those in favour with the 
President, Even if the advisors think that the policies entert-
ained are unfavourable, they will tend to suppress their true 
assessments out of fear for their positions. As a matter of 
general policy it would be well for presidents to consult 
people who possess expertise but differing view points. 
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112. ARNHART ((^rry). "God-like prince": John Locke Executive 
prerogative and the American presidency. Presi Stud Quart; 
9, 2; Spr 1979; 121-30. 
Mentions that it would be unwise to deny the Presidents' 
claim to wide discretionary powers that are essential for the 
good of the country. The main concern should be rather to allow 
the president to exercise such powers when necessary and yet 
to prevent him from misusing them. This attitude is supported 
by Locke's view of executive prerogative; since its in the 
nature of things to be always in motion, prerogative allows 
for a flexible response to this natural flux. 
113. BALFOUR (N). US Presidency in danger. Wld today; 29, 12; 
1973; 505-13, 
Discusses that the American system works only if the 
president exercises power in cooperation with the legislature 
and the people. R Nixon still has power, as his handling of 
the energy crises, shows, but his use of that power is now 
suspect. His original faults lay in his attempts to concentrate 
authority narrowly in the white House and his refusal to 
recognize that dissent was legitimate. Under the pressure of 
recent months the Vthite House has ceased to function as it 
should and the US has at times seemed to be without any gover-
nment at all, 
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114. BARBER (JD). Adult identity and presidential style: the 
rhetorical emphasisa^^aedalus; 97, 3; 1968; 938-68. 
States that the political style of a president of the 
United States, that is his habitual practices in rhetoric, 
interpersonal relations and administrative management, may be 
predicted from an analysis of the life stage in which he first 
adopted an identity as a political person, usually in late 
adolescence or early adulthood. This formative period may be 
marked by rapid success in valued achievement, a new and special 
relationship to group life, and a relatively rapid expansions 
of his field of power. 
115. BARILLEAUX (Ryan J), Presidency: Levels of analysis. 
Presi Stud Quart; 14, 1; Wint 1984; 73-7. 
Discusses that awareness of the distinctions between 
the idaCsyncratic and governmental levels can lead to insights 
into how personal differences of presidents and their associates 
affect inter governmental relations. Sensivity to different 
levels of analysis can help to classify how different types 
of presidential scholarship all fit into the general field of 
presidency studies. Biographies are relevant in that they can 
provide in-depth studies of how individuals have shaped the 
presidency. 
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116. BERNSTEIN (Barton J). Road to watergate and beyond: The 
growth and abuse of executive authority since 1940. Law 
and contemporary Problem; 40, 2; Spr 1976; 58-86. 
Mentions that the abuses of presidential power and the 
growth of the authority of the federal bureau of investigation 
are at the heart of this examination of modern American political 
life. The authors main purpose is to demonstrate the close 
collaboration between the FBI and Presidents which eventually 
led to the record of political abuses and illegalities during 
the past fifty years. The enormous influence and near autonomy 
of Edger Hoover at the Head of a powerful police system is 
plained for each of the administrations. 
117. BINKLEY (WE). President as Chief legislator. A Amer Acad 
Polit See Sci; 307; Sept 1956; 92-105. 
Discusses that the dynamic forces of American society 
have transformed the chief executive of the written constitution 
into the chief legislator of the unwritten constitution. There 
is a stri»king contrast between the prescriptions for the 
presidency in the constitution and the functioning reality of 
the great office in the mid 20th centxiry. This revision of the 
President as chief legislator was the result of two factors. 
Finally the public for a veriety of reasons expected the 
86 
president to initiate legislation. Secondly the attitudes of 
the Presidents themselves underwent a change. The author also 
discusses the various devices presidents have evolved to promote 
legislation, 
118. BOROSAGE (Robert L). Para-legal authority and its perils. 
Law and Contemporary Problems; 40, 3; Jun 1976; 166-88. 
Reveals that the growth of executive power in US has 
been rationalized by legal argument. Three primary doctrines-
inherent power, congressional delegation and post hoc ratifi-
cation-have been employed within the executive branch to 
justify executive initiative without legislative authority, 
Although seldom reviewed and more rarely adopted in supreme 
court decisions, these arguments provide the paralegal authority 
upon which broad segments of the bureaucracy operate. This 
paper uses a recent example of this assertion - the legal 
justification of covert action by the CIA - to outline the 
logic and effect of the justififation and to comment on the 
limits of reform in such a situation. 
119. BROWN (Roger G)and WELBORN (David M). Presidents and their 
parties: Performance and prospects. Presi Stud Quart; 
12, 3; Sum 1982; 302-16. 
States that the President party relationship is 
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assessed in light of recent interpretations suggesting the 
emergence of a non-partisan, even anti-party presidency. Two 
dimensions of the relationship are examined in the cases of 
Presidents serving since 1961; performance of the party 
leadership role and partisanship. The analysis concludes that 
the stronger the affective disposition towards party, the 
more likely it is that the party leadership role and partis-
enship. The analysis concludes that the stronger the effective 
disposition toward party, the more likely it is that the party 
leadership role will be played with son« vigour, 
120. CEASER (James W), Rise of the rhetorical presidency. 
Presi Stud Quart; 11, 2; 1981; 158-71. 
Reveals that the rhetorical presidency is based on 
words not power. When connected in a practical way with the 
exercise of power, speech can be effective, but when used to 
generate public support its apt to fail. Far from reinforcing 
American principles and protecting its institutions, the 
rhetorical presidency leads to a neglect of principles in 
formulating hopes and to ignore the benefits and needs of the 
state institutions in favour of a fleeting sense of oneness 
with the leaders. 
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121, CRONIN (Thomas E). Presidential power revised and 
reappraised. West Polit Quart; 32, 4; Dec 1979; 381-95. 
States that this article argues that how social scient-
ists portray US presidential power and the presidency may 
promote misleading as well as helpfulconceptions of presid-
ential effectiveness. The article summarizes contemporary 
mainstream thinking about the power of residents and the study 
of presidential leadership. Finally the article reviews the 
contemporary rebirth of yearning for a more assertive and 
effective presidency. 
122. EDWARDS (GC). Presidential influence in the House: 
Presidential prestige as a source of presidential power, 
A new polit Sci R; 70, 1; Mr 1976; 1-3. 
Describes that the presidential prestige or popularity 
has often been cited as an important source of presidential 
influence in congress. Its' not been empirically demonstrated 
that such a relationship exists. The study examines a variety 
of relationship between presidential prestige and support in 
the US House of Representatives, The relationships between overall 
national presidential popularity on the one hand and overall 
domestic and foreign policy presidential support in the House 
as a whole and among various groups of congressmen on the other 
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are generally weak. Consistently strong relationship are found 
between presidential prestige among democratic party identifiers 
and presidential support among democratic congressmen. Similar 
relationships are found between presidential prestige among the 
more partisan Repxiblican party identifiers and presidential 
support by Republican Congressmen. 
123, EDWARDS (George C), Presidential electoral performance as 
a source of presidential power. Amer J Polit Sci; 22, 1; 
Feb 1978; 152-67. 
Describes that one of the most fertile areas of research 
in American politics has been that focussing on the vote in 
presidential elections. Most studies in this area however take 
the presidential vote as the dependent variable. This research 
carries the analysis further and examines the influence of the 
support of that constituencies congressman for the presidents 
policies. Using the techniques of casual modeling and path 
analysis, this article test for both the direct influence of 
the presidential vote on presidential support and for its 
indirect influence through its effect on the party which win§ 
the seat in a congressional party strength. The basic finding 
is that presidential electoral performance does influence 
presidential support, particularly in democratic presidential 
year. 
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124. ENGEMAN (Thomas S), Presidential Statesraenship and the 
Constitution: The limits of presidential studies. Rev Pol; 
44, 2; Apr 1982; 266-81. 
Reviews that every US President faces decisive crises 
which must be solved in order to maintain respect for his admin-
istration. There is a constitution need for enterprise if the 
President is to meet the changing circumstances. While this 
enterprise can present a danger to the constitutional order, 
the absence of such statesmanship presents even greater dangers. 
The successful president combines an understanding of democratic 
principles with a prudent assessment of. his moments possibilities, 
125. FLEISHMAN (Joel L) and AUFSES (Arther H). Law and orders: 
The problem of presidential legislation. Law and Contemporary 
Problems; 40, 3; Sum 1956; 1-45, 
Discusses that the constitution expects both conflict 
and cooperation between President and Congress, Presidential 
legislation enables the executive to escape conflicts and 
avoid cooperation. It undermines democratic norms when it 
enacts policy without full concurrence or accountability* A 
remedy lies in a return to constitutional principles. This will 
encourage the President to work with congress but it will not 
impair the ability of the President to influence congress 
legitimately. 
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126. FURNAS (H). President: A changing role? A Amer Acad Soc Sci; 
380; Nov 1968; 9-15. 
Reviews that the manner in which the President discharges 
his foreign affairs responsibility is likely to change mark-
edly in the next few years, for the atmosphere of our national 
life is changing. The American mood will not be isolationist, 
The foreign affairs agencies might[ then have to coordinate 
themselves, for the President may have neither the time nor the 
inclination to contribute as he has here - to face. It will 
also be essential to relate foreign policy more closely to the 
broader national scene, for the 1970s foreign affairs will have 
to conpete with domestic needs for resources as well as 
presidential attention. The President might therefore, be better 
served in the future by a secretary of state with broad national 
experience rather then by another of the foreign affairs 
specialists who have held the job in recent administrations. 
In the period since world war II, there has not evolved any 
generally satisfactory way of organizing the various foreign 
affairs agencies to meet the Presidents needs. 
127. GUSTAFSON (Merlin). Our part time chief of state. Presi 
Stud Quart; 9, 2; Spr 1979; 163-71. 
Reviews that among his many responsibilities the 
President of the United States serves as the nations' chief 
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of state. Since this duty appears to be a burden on the President 
a number of scholars have proposed the establishment of a 
separate office to take over the function. A new chief of state 
would perform ceremonial duties and relieve the President of 
this time consuming task, A study of appointment calenders of 
recent Presidents reveals, however, that playing the role of 
chief of state has not really been a b\irden. Furthermore, the 
Presidents ceremonial activities may be expanded or contracted 
to accqpodate his work schedule. The real issue is whether the 
US needs a full time ceremonial head. Arguments may be made on 
both- sides of this question, but most persuasive are on the 
negative side. 
128. HARGROVE (EC). Presidential personality and revisionist 
views of the Presidency. Amer J Pol Sci; 17, 4; Nv 1973; 
819-25. 
Mentions that we are entering as period of revisionist 
writing about the US presidency. In fact it appears that 
revisionist thought about the presidency in political science 
may have something of a conservative flavour which will seek 
to diminish the heroic conception of the presidency. 
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129. HART (John). Presidential power revisited. Polit Stud; 
25, 1; Mr 1977; 48-61. 
Describes that the recent literature on the American 
Presidency is examined with particular reference to the seminal 
influence of R Neustadt's Presidential power. It argues that 
the so called revisionist theories of the post Watergate era 
have produced a shift of emphasis rather than substance and 
that Neustadt's "ideal type" of presidency is still upheld 
by political scientists. Two other dimensions of his work, 
the methodological and theoretical are discussed. Its argued 
that these aspects have not received such critical attention 
as the normative features of Presidential power and that in 
the light of recent events both need some modifications. 
130. HENRY (LL). Transferring the Presidency: Variations, Trends 
and Patterns. Publ Adm R; 20, 4; Aut 1960; 187-95. 
In the US government, transitions to a new president 
and administration are periods of crisis and rapid change. 
Despite historical variations and institutional change, many 
problems and modes of behaviour are recurrent in these periods. 
The principal danger under modern conditions is of leadership 
breakdown between election and inauguration. In recent trans-
ition, recognition of the problem has stimulated efforts and 
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incoming regimes to bridge the gap. A change in the presidency, 
with attendant turnover of top level personnel, creates a 
crisis for the principal governmental institutions such as the 
political parties, congress, interest groups and foreign and 
international organisations. The crisis is particularly severe 
for the bureaucracy, which must prove its reliability and 
withstand patronage pressures, while adjusting to new leaders, 
new policies, and reorganisations. 
131. HIRSCHPIELD (RS). Reality of presidential power. Pari Aff; 
21, 4; Aut 1968; 375-83. 
Describes that there are two basic facts about presi-
dential power in the United States (i) it cannot be precisely 
defined (ii) there are many conceptions of its scope and limits, 
The constitutions creates an office which is potentially, but 
not necessarily, powerful; the men who occupy it can be 'Great 
Presidents* on failures. In a governmental system noted for 
its pragmatism, the presidency is the most pragmatic institu-
tion. Its an office of prodigious powers for the man who is 
willing and able to taXe and use that power. 
132. HIRCHFIELD (Robert S). Problem of presidential power. 
Dialogue; 7, 3; 1974; 3-12. 
Discusses that despite its current urgency the problem 
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of defining the scope and limits of US presidential power is 
not new. There are in fact very different conceptions of 
executive authority sinply because that authority cannot be 
simply defined. The reality of presidential power varies and 
what its at any given moment is determined by five major 
factors (i) the formal constitutional sources of executi^ e^ 
authority are currently interpreted; (2) the state of the 
political system in which the presidency is operating (3) the 
personal attributes and attitudes of the incumbent president 
(4) the particular set of circumstances confronting the nation 
and (5) the popularity of the president and the degree to which 
he enjoys the publics trust and confidence. All of these 
factors change from time to time and from president, to president. 
And since the power of the presidency is the product of inter-
acting among all of them, the dimensions of that power are 
also continually changing, 
133. HOFFMAN (Kenneth E). Stabilizing the presidency. Presi 
Stud Quart; 2, 2; Spr 1979; 172-79, 
Mentions that reasons for stabilizing the presidency 
are threats of and stress of war, depression, inflation etc. 
Proposals for this goal include; as presidential council, 
moving the senate into the executive branch; a two year president 
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elect and a single six year term for president. The two years 
as president elect would provide time for in depth information, 
personal directions of btidget development, A vote of confidence 
every two years would increase popular control of the presidents, 
to support or remove, as expressed by the people, 
134, HYMAN (S). Art of the Presidency. A Amer Acad Polit Sec Sci? 
307; Sept 1956; 1-9. 
States that the American presidency has a dual nature, 
its a constitutional office and its an institution. The 
presidents problem is to meet the peoples' expectations, 
centred in the institution from within the hard forms of law 
centred in the office. He has three possible positional stands. 
As a Buchanien, he will be concerned more with form than with 
substance, emphasizing the legalistic aspect of the presidency 
as an office built to the specification of a written constitution, 
On the other hand, a lincolnian president would regard the 
presidency as a dynamic national and international institutions. 
Between the two is the stand of the clevendian, a mixture of 
the two positional stand that flank him. Within the context 
of an historical situations one of these stands may be suitable. 
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135. KELLERMAN (Barbara). Political functions of the presidential 
family. Presi Stud Quart; 8, 3; 1978; 303-18. 
Discusses that for reasons which include the increase 
in the numbier and importance of primaries presidents families 
now have a major and still increasing impact on the course of 
US presidential politics. All the family members play political 
roles although the nature of these roles differs. The roles 
fall into two broad categories; those whose functions it is 
to mediate between the president and the public and those 
functions it is to sustain the president. In both cases 
relations becomes symbolically and practically an integral 
paft of the executive machinery, 
136. KENDALL(Wi.Two Majorities. Mid West J Polit Sc;4,4; Nov 1960; 
317-45. 
The tension between executive and legislative on federal 
level of the American political system has become a character-
istic feature of American politics. Certain areas of public 
policy are readily indentifiable as associated with this 
tension. "Internal security", |x)rk barrel "practices of congress", 
"protectionism", immigration, integration, foreign aid, 
government expenditure, and so on, are issues on which the 
executive tends to reflect what is regarded as enlightened 
opinion among intellectuals, while congress is considered as 
the stronghold of entrenched minorities. The executive legis-
lative tension is rooted in the existence of two majorities, 
the electorate being encouraged to over estimate its dedication 
to moral principle in one t^he presidential election) and 
obliged to take a more realistic view of themselves in another 
(the congressional election). Face to this tension, the 
deepest issue between American conservation and American 
liberalism should be reopened to discussion. 
137. KOENING (Louis W), Reassessing the imperial presidency. 
Proc Acad Pol Sc; 34, 2; 1981; 31-44. 
States that the notion of an imperial presidency both 
contributes to a weakening of todays presidency and mis-states 
its true conditions. In fact the US congress increasingly 
limits the president's policy choices. While presidential 
leadership is being denigrated by charges that its an imperial 
presidency the demands on it are fast enlarging. The idea of 
an imperial presidency can only make the already difficult job 
of the president even more difficult. 
138, KOENIG (LW). Man and the Institution. A Amer Acad Polit 
Soc Sci; 307; Sept 1956; 10-4. 
Mentions that all executive posts are part institutional 
and part man, but the presidency/ more than any other executive, 
enjoys special opportunities for personal self expression. Its 
because of this that the central problem of the presidency has 
emerged the problem concerns the presidencys capacity to provide 
continuous high level leadership. In the 20th century the crisis 
of depression and war have expanded and Enlarged the presidents' 
personal role and reduced the number of traditional institutional 
restraints to the gain of his personal freedom of action. The 
major danger of the modern presidency is that personality may 
become a substitute for policy. Nevertheless various institutional 
developments of the office seem to indicate that this danger 
has been reduced, 
139, KUIC (V), Theory and practice of the American Presidency, 
R Polit; 23, 3; Jly 1961; 307-22. 
Discusses that the relative as well as absolute 
aggrandizement of the executive branch of the national government 
is the outstanding single fact in the political experience of 
the US. The Presidency today is not only stronger in relation 
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to congress and the supreme court, but its role in the whole 
life of the nation has become much larger than apparently 
envisaged by the founders, 
140. KYNERD (T). Analysis of presidential greatness and president 
rating. Southern Quart; 9, 3; Apr 1971; 302-29. 
Mentions that the article analyses the various works 
dealing with the ratings of Presidents of the United states. 
It studies the nature and basis of these ratings, the criteria 
used and their usefulness. These ratings are then treated 
statistically, compared through rank correlation techniques 
and related to party membership, A critical conclusion is 
drawn urging the establishment of a fairer and more objective 
rating techniques, 
141. LEGERE (LJ). Presidential perspective. For Pol; 1972; 
84-94. 
Discusses that the American President who wants to 
concentrate much of his personal attention on domestic affairs 
should first accord high priority to discriminating opposition 
to his military policy in the power centres that count most 
in his government. By imposing fiscal ceilings on defence 
expenditures and then allowing the military professionals 
substantial autonomy within those ceilings, the president 
may achieve something less than perfect rationality in the 
defense budget^ but he will have neutralized a potentially 
dangerous source of distraction from his goal of addressing 
domestic concerns more vigoriously, 
142. LONGAKER (RR). President as international leader. Law and 
Contemporary Problems; 21, 4; Aut 1956; 735-52. 
Describes that before the second world war,international 
leadership was exercised by the American president temporarily 
and reluctantly. Now its an indispensable function of his off±ce. 
American leadership is seriously impaired by the lack of 
harmony at home on important international questions and its 
requires a presidential willingness to sacrifice immediate 
political advantage in the long term interests of the nation 
and the entire world. The historical development of this role 
of the president is sketched. The effect of international 
leadership on the presidents' other activities is also 
considered, 
143, LYONS (GM). President and his experts. A Amer Acad Polit 
Soc Sci; 394; Mr 1971; 36-45. 
Describes that there is a useful distinction between 
the president of the United States and the presidency, especially 
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important because of the critical role of the president in 
shaping the public interest. Agencies making up the institutional 
presidency have evolved over'the years to serve the growing 
needs of the president. Within these agencies, moreover, social 
scientists, among other experts have been brought into the 
orbit of presidential power as expertise has become important 
to the planning process. 
144. MANHEIM (Jaral B). Honeymoon's over: The news conference 
and the development of presidential style. J Polit; 41, 1; 
Feb 1979; 55-74. 
States the during the early years of a US presidential 
administration there takes place a general process of in-role 
socialization. During this period the president becomes 
generally less oriented towards action but more self reliant 
and becomes less assertive of his own responsibility as he 
learns its limitations. He becomes less concerned with the 
future and shifts his interests from the arena of domestic 
policy, where symbols of conflict and division prevail, to 
that of foreign policy, where unifying symbols are more common. 
145. MANSFIELD (HC). Reorganizing the Federal Executive branch: 
The limits of institutionalization. Law and Contemporary 
Problems; 35, 3; Sum 1970; 461-95. 
States that the common supposition that the 
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reorganization Act of 1939, resolved previous impasses by 
providing a standard institutionalized process forsettling 
executive - legislative contests over the shape of the 
executive branch is an exaggeration, A review of all the 
major efforts at across the broad reorganization since 1887. 
Shows a decisive shift in the shift from congress to the 
president. But it also shows presidents turning from public 
commissions and budget, budget and employing instead adhoc 
unpublicized task forces to formulate their recommendations. 
Presidents Johnson and Nixon both active in this field, have 
found that this pethod keeps more of the cards in their hands 
longer. 
146. MORRIS (TD). Reappearing the US Presidency. Bureaucrat; 
3, 3; Oct 1974; 366-75. 
Reveals that the dominant theme of the book "The 
Presidency reappraisal" iA that the president continues to 
be the chief executive. He can no longer be the governments 
administrator, given the vastness of his responsibilities, 
A variety of authors deal with following problems; the 
expanding presidency and the role of congress, the presidential 
condition, the presidential person and the presidents perfor-
mance and accountability. The work enunciates a vision of the 
futiore and how to make future presiden<bies more accountable. 
10^ 
147. NEUSTADT (RE). Presidency at Mid Century. Law and 
Contemporary Protelero; 21, 4; Aut 1956; 609-45. 
Describes that the functioning of the presidency as 
a national managing agency is examined. Traditionally the 
president has been at the meeting point of three lines of 
leadership, executive, partisan and national; now a fourth, 
international, sphere has been added. The president now has 
a personal staff of several hundred, but still bear sole 
responsibility for important decisions, examples of which 
are given. His freedom of choice and action and thus his 
personal power are severely.limited by the complexity of 
modern government. A great deal of his work involves persuading 
others to act or to desist but even his power to persuade is 
limited. 
148. NICHOLAS (HG). Insulation of the Presidency. Govt and 
oppositions; 8, 2; Spr 1973; 156-76, 
Discusses that from Eisenhower to Nixon the presidency 
has shown a progressive insulation and centralisation. At 
elections candidates create a personal machine and in office 
subordinate these party and the cabinet to the white House. 
The expansion of the executive office of the presidency and 
his personal staff has made the president more independent 
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of the executive departments than ever before. This personal 
staff is also used to control congress and to promote the 
presidents image. 
149. NITZE (PH). Modern president as a world figure. A Amer 
Acad Polit Soc Sci; 307; Sept 1956; 114-23. 
Reveals that the American President has two types of 
duties. The first type of flows directly from the constitution. 
Duties of the second type are not explicitly provided for by 
the constitution. The non-constitutional responsibility of the 
president which produces the greatest difficulties is that of 
being the leader of the Western coalition. The president bears 
a primary responsibility to the American electorate and a 
less well-defined responsibility to the larger non-voting 
constituency of the free world. In dealing with allies he is 
at the same time, the chief diplomafet of the US seeking to 
uphold the national interest and the leader of the western 
coalition seeking to strengthen it against a common external 
threat. To a certain extent the ability of the modern president 
to give effective leadership at home and to the coalition 
depends on his fulfilling an additional function concurrently 
with his other responsibilities. 
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150, PALETZ (DL). Perspectives on the Presidency, Law and 
Contemporary Problems; 35, 3; 1970; 429-44, 
Reveals that various perspectives found in the literature 
devoted to the American presidency can be characterized as 
follows (a) enumeration of the Presidents roles (b) identifi-
cation of presidential, obligations (c) depiction of contraints 
on the president advice on how through statecraft best to 
employ presidential powers, advocacy of anti-aggrandizement 
of the powers of the office and portrayal of the presidency 
as only one among a nexus of institution controlled by a power 
elite. These perspectives can be compared along four dimensions; 
presidential responsibilities, the powers of the office, the 
importance of the incximbents behaviour and prescriptions for 
institutional changes, 
151, PATTERSON (James T), Rise of presidential power before 
world war II. Law and Contemporary Problems; 40, 2; Spr 
1976; 39-57. 
Reviews that the founding fathers were ambivalent about 
executive power and the presidency remained relatively weak 
during most of the 19th century. From 1898 to 1920, however, 
presidential powers escalated rapidly. Among the major causes 
10? 
for such growth were the need for an executive forces to 
mediate between labour and management, the incapacity of 
other branches of government to stabilize an industrializing 
society and again foreign affairs and war. After 1920s two 
new forces augmented presidential power. First the Great 
Depression and second the rise of a new electorate of urbanites, 
immigrants and blue collar workers gave Roosevelt the popular 
prestige necessary for the exercise of power. 
152. PEAR (RH). American Presidency under Eisenhower. Polit 
Quart; 28, 1; Jan-Mr 1957; 5-12. 
States that discussions on the American presidency 
can usefully be centered rovmd such topics as the constitutional 
VS the leader role of president and the presidents' role as 
chief administrator. While president Truman asserted that 
under the American system the president cannot, either 
constitutionally or morally, delegate his powers or share 
his bijurdens with cabinet colleagues, president. Eisenhower 
has done precisely that the core of the Elsenhower reforms 
is the cabinet which he has made work hard and effectively to 
a definite schedule and as a team. 
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153. PLISCHKE (E). Presidents* right to go abroad. Orbis; 
15, 3; 1971; 755-83. 
States that this essay considers three main questions -
the legal right of the president of the US to perform his 
responsibilities away from the national seat of government, 
his right to leave the jurisdiction of the US and perform his 
functions abroad and his responsibilities respecting the 
approval or disapproval of legislation within the constitution-
ally prescribed period whevever he happens to be located. The 
realities of presidential ability to perform his duties abroad 
as distinguished from his right to do so, also is considered. 
These issues are posed in relation to presidential involvement 
in international conferencing Summit visits and presidential 
tours abroad - as elements of diplomacy at the summit. 
154. REEDY (GE). Presidency in 1976: Focal point of Political 
Unity? J Polit; 38, 3; Ag 1976; 228-38. 
Reviews that this article argues that the presidency 
has two functions in the US structure political leadership and 
national unification. The debacle of Vietnam plus the scandal 
of Watergate severely impaired the ability of the institution 
to carry out the second function. For a brief period, the 
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presidency itself appeared to be an endangered office due 
to the lack of public confidence. However, the appointment 
of Mr. Ford enabled the Americans once again to identify on 
a personal basis with the president and today the institution 
is operating unimpaired. The analysis is based upon comparison 
on recent events with long range trends in American society. 
155. RUSK (D). President. For Aff; 38, 3; Apr 1960; 353-69. 
States that president of the USA with the support of 
congress, supplies the leadership in foreign relations. He 
holds a unique office in a unique constitutional system. His 
powers are as large as the situations requires. The presidents 
office has been transformed in the last few decades through 
the involvement of the federal government in the economic and 
social life of the nation. Yet negotiations at the chief of 
government level is not easily accommodated in the American 
constitutional system. The presidemt has not enough time for 
serious preparations for summit negotiations, his physical 
absence from Washington impairs the effective performance f 
his office. Direct Confrontation of those with final auth 
is counselled against. If constructive at)reemp.n<-o 
w-eements are . unlikely 
to be reached summit meetings are pointless. 
11)0 
156. WEINER (Sonford) and WILDAVSKY (Aaron). Prophylectic 
Presidency. Publ Int;52; Sum 1978; 3-19. 
Discusses that the prophylectric presidency would place 
a high degree of planning power in the hands of the US President 
and would call for a radical redistribution of power within 
the federal system. However, the model of social interaction 
implicit in this vision does not work for the varied interme-
diary groups that characterize the American political system. 
None of them is needed if cognitive calculation can provide 
one best choice and all stand in the way of the direct relat-
ionship between a prophylectic president and the people. 
157. WILDAVSKY (A). Past and future Presidency. Publ Int; 
41; 1975; 56-76. 
States that separating the US presidency from the people-
as if presidents owed everything to them and they nothing to 
him makes as much sense as removing the people from the govern-
ment it has instituted. That the people may reject their 
presidents is obvious, that the presidents might flee from 
their people is less so. Presidents who tried to exercise 
powers they did not have might than be replaced by Presidents 
unwilling to exercise the powers they do have. The future of 
the presidency will be determined not by the presidency alone 
but by how presidents behave in response to the environment 
created by the people. Presidents can retreat as well as advance. 
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158, WRIGHT (E). First in War, first in peace. The ^^erican 
presidency under challenge. Round Table; 260; Oct 1975i 
389-99. 
Mentions that despite appearances to the contrary 
Vietnam and Watergate - the American presidency is not in 
decline. It has happened before; in 1945 when Truman succeeded 
Roosvelt and in 1918 when the Senate thwarted woodrow wilson. 
Whatever the current mood, the American presidency is still the 
most powerful electoral office in the world. 
159. YANKELOVICH (Daniel). Fare well to "President knows 
best". For Aff; 57, 3; 1979; 670-93. 
Discusses that Vietnam and Watergate were pivotoA 
events in spurring the American public towithdraw automatic 
support for presidential initiatives.But a continuing mood 
of skepticism and lack of confidence in the presidency can 
no longer be blamed on these fast receding historical episodes. 
Today public misturst of presidential leadership in foreign 
affairs is almost an accidental by product of a larger decline 




160. MENE2 (JF), Presidential papers and presidential libraries. 
Soc Sci (vJin field)? 47, 1; Wint 1972; 34-9. 
Describes that a long time intriguing questions concerns 
the ownership of presidential papers. Which papers are private 
and which are public? The matter is not settled if it ever will 
be - although some ground rules in determining this question 
have developed. A related questions - also unsettled deals 
with the final resting place - public or private of presidential 
papers. Should they be deposited in one place as in the library 
of congress or in nximerous regional presidential libraries? 
Lastly what part does the public interest play in the preser-
vation of presidential papers? 
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161. HALPERIN (MH). President and the military. For Aff; 50, 2; 
Jan 1972; 310-24. 
Describes that the US Presidents dependence on the 
bureaucracy and his limited freedom to manoeurve are acute in 
all areas, but the military posses a special problem; finding 
alternative sources of military advice. The political influence 
of the military has been substantially reduced in recent years. 
Presidents not been content with their relations with the 
military; they have used various devices to overcome the 
limitations on their power. Occasionally the president has 
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used the power of his office to accomplish his objectives 
despite military opposition. The president could now institute 
two basic changes to increase his power over the military, one 
involving the channels of advice the other concerning the role 
of civilian advisers. The new procedures do not imply a down 
grading of military advice but would assure that the President 
receives the full range of existing military opinions. 
ASSESSMENT 
162. MANLEY (John F). Presidential power and white House 
Lobbying. Polit Sci Quart; 93, 3; Sum 1978; 255-75. 
Discusses that two theories of presidential power, 
the problematic and supremacy theories are assessed using 
evidence on the white House office of congressional Relations, 
ASSESSMENT, KENNEDY 
163, NEUSTADT (RE) , Kennedy in the Presidency: A premattore 
appraisal. Polit Sci Quart; 79, 3; Sept 1961; 321-34. 
Mentions that there are many ways to look at the 
performance of a president of the US - one is to assess his 
operational effectiveness as man in office, a single individual 
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amidst a vast machine. Its useful to p@se some questions 
(1) what were his purposes and did these run with or against 
the grain of history and were they relevent? What was his 
fefel, his human understanding, for the nature of his power 
in the circumstances of his time? What was his stance xinder 
pressure in office? What was his legacy? He seems to have been 
committed to correct, pre-eminent concerns; to disentangle 
the necessary from the merely possible and then act with 
decrity. Legislatively he may not have used to the full his 
advantages of his office but the answer might be "this man 
could do no more". Finally, he displayed what presidents must 
do to minimize the risk of war through mutual miscalculations; 
this may well be the cardinal risk confronting his successors. 
If so, he made a major contribution to the presidency. 
BILLS 
164. WAYNE (Stephen J) and HYDE (James FC Jr). Presidential 
decision making on enrolled bills, Presi Stud Quart; 
8, 3; Sum 1978; 284-94. 
The enrolled bill process is a unique advisory 
mechanism characterized by its severe time constraints, 
objection orientation, and lack of compromise. The formal 
procedures of the process have remained remarkably stable 
since their inception. Run by career civil servants in the 
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Old Bureau of the Budget who had access and influence at the 
white House, Budget's coordination and evaluation of agency 
and department recommendations became the cornerstone of the 
entire process. The growth and differentiation of the white 
House staff, beginning in the mid 1960s, affected the way in 
which enrolled bills were handled. Largely as a consequence 
of the expansion of the white House staff, presidential aides 
were able to give greater attention to the consideration of 
enrolled bills. While this could have reduced the office of 
Management and Budget's (0MB) role and lessened its influence, 
it did not. The president and his aides continued to seek 
and rely on the 0MB for coordination and advice, 
BUREAUCRACY 
165. BROWN (DS). President and the bureaus: Time for a renewal 
of relationships? Publ Adm R; 26, 3; Sept 1965; 174-82. 
States that the importance of the relationships between 
the president and the bureau has long been recognized. Its 
the bureaus which, in large, part carry out presidential policy 
directives. How, in a presidents crowded Schedule can be fit 
in meetings with bureau chiefs and what would a president 
discuss in these meetings? Although presidents will answer 
these questions for themselves, the author suggests that the 
time has arrived for a renewal of close relationships. 
n^ 
166. CHAI (Jal Hiing) , Presidential control of the foreign 
policy bureaucracy: The Kennedy Case. Presi Stud Quart; 
8, 4; Fall 1978 391-403. 
Describes that a President must control the permanent 
government and he himself must be checked by the bureaucrfluCf 
especially if it has to serve as a counterforce to the emergence 
of an unpaid presidency. Although the high powered White House 
bureaucracy serves the president with loyalty, no President 
can govern the nation with the assistance on only the palace 
guards. The president needs counsel and assistence from 
experts and professionals in their permanent government. 
167. KRASNER (SD). Are bureaucracies important? For Pol; 
7, 1972; 1969-79. 
Reveals that in the American system, the president 
selects department secretaries. This selection is based in 
large part on compatibility of view points. The information 
and options received by the president cannot be viewed as 
independent determinants of foreign policy. Presidential 
values, not bureaucratic politics are the major determinant 
of government policy, 
l l f f 
168, MERRIAM (RE). Biareau of the Budget as Part of the Presidents' 
Staff, A Amer Acad PolIt Soc Sci; 307? Sept 1956; 15-23. 
Describes that the bureau of the budget is part of the 
Executive office of the President and exists to serve the 
president directly in the complicated process of decision 
making. The primary importance of the bureau lies in its role 
as a key element in the staff organization built arotond the 
president. The president can best fulfill his functions when 
he is provided with such a professional staff. The link between 
budgetary activities and the presidents* executive functions 
has saturated the budget process with co-ordinating decisions 
reaching the conduct of administration. In return the staff 
relationship between the budget Bureau and the President has 
made for a substantially strengthened type of executive control. 
Despite various criticisms the Bureau helps the president to 
be better prepared for the great responsibilities which he 
alone must bear. 
169, RANDALL (Ronald). Presidential power versus bureaucratic 
intransigence: The influence of the Nixon administration 
on welfare policy. Amer Pol Sci Rev; 73, 3; Sept 1979; 
795-810. 
Describes that many observers routinely assert the 
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relative weakness of president before the bureaucracy. The 
research of this study, guided by a structuralist theory of 
organizations, provides evidence of the Nixon administrations 
power to change policy even over the opposition of the breeau-
cracy concerning the Aid to Families with Dependent children 
programme. The study demonstrate that the management tools 
available to the president and top officials, when used 
adroitly are more powerful then is generally presumed. That 
presidents can affix their indelible stamps on policy by short 
circuiting the legislative process and dominating the bureaucracy 
is more than a remote possibility. 
CABINET, A CASE STUDY 
170. FENNO (RF Jr). President - Cabinet relations: A Pattern 
and a Case Study Amer Polit Sci R; 52, 2; Je 1758; 388-405. 
States that in a pluralistic political system, 
characterized by the fragmented and decentralized distribution 
of power, the relationship between the president and his 
individual cabinet member may not be a hierarchical or helpful 
or intimate one. This is because the problems of success and 
survival of a cabinet officer encourage him to consolidate 
his own basis of support and compel him to operate with a 
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degree of independence from the president, A particulastic, 
independent pattern of behaviour has a debilitating affect 
upon the work of fehe cabinet as a group especially at the 
cabinet meeting. It severely limits the usefulness to the 
chief executive of his cabinet as an advisory or a decision 
making body, 
COMMUNICATION 
171, SEYMOUR URE (Colin), Presidential power, press secretaries 
and communication. Pol it Stud'i 28, 2; Je 1980; 253-70, 
States that this article explores the relationship 
between an American presidents public communications and 
his power and illustrates it by considering his relations 
with his press Secretary, Communication is central to the 
concept of power and to the functioning of the presidency, 
but the relationship has attracted insufficient attention in 
the literature. The article argue that a Presidents control 
over how he is publicly understood is weak. Communication being 
central to power, lack of control implies a we^k view of the 
power of the president. The ability of both president and 
Secretary to make the president understood is jeopardised 
by aspects of the secretary's personality and performance 
and by the nature of the presidency and the style of the 
ipcombent, 
CONGRESS 
172, CHRISTENSON (Reo M), Presidential leadership of Congress: 
Ten commandments point the way. Presi Stud Quart; 8, 3; 
Sxjin 1978; 257-68. 
Discusses that presidential legislative initiatives 
frequently draw upon the congressional legislative J)rocedures, 
But unless a president incorporates them into his program, 
bills sponsored in the Houses of Congress are likely to perish 
there. Almost every year brings fresh evidence that congress 
is unable to develop an internal leadership that can give 
direction and discipline to a semi-anarchic legislature. Thus 
there's a need for a president with the vision, cotirage and 
the skill to convert congress into a constructive body. There 
are operational principles which can facilitate leadership of 
congress. Every president should heed there in his dealing with 
that body, 
173. DAVIS (Eric L), Legislative reform and the decline of 
presidential influence on capital Hill. Brit J Pol Sci; 
9, 4; Oct 1979; 465-79. 
Describes that many of the recent changes in the US 
congress have made that body fop less permeable to presidential 
influence then was the case even a few years ago. Three changes 
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are particularly important in this regard - the increasingly 
elaborate division of labotir within the congress, as exemplified 
by the growth of the sub-committee system, the trend towards 
almost automatic reelection for those House members see>cing 
another term and more complex and less predictable coalitional 
alignments among the various factors which make up the political 
parties in the congress. 
174, EDWARDS (George C IIIl.. President and congress; The 
inevitability of conflict. Presi Stud Quart; 8,3; Sum 
1978; 245-57. 
Mentions that a central issue in American politics is 
the conflict which always seem to exist between the president 
and congress. There are four basic soxurces of this conflict 
beyond personal differences and the necessity of cooperation 
due to shared powers. The first is the different constituencies 
of the president and members of congress; second is the difference 
between the hierarchical structure of the executive branch and 
the decentralized structure of congress. A third source of 
conflict is the difference in the information and expertise-
available to each branch and fourth is the different time 
perspectives of presidents and members of congress. These sources 
of conflict inevitably lead the two branches to view policies 
differently. 
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175. FRYE (Alton). Congress and President^ The balance wheels 
of American foreign policy. Yale Rev; 69, 1; Aut 1979; 
1-16. 
Mentions that the first principle of a harmonious 
relationship between congress and the presidency is the concept 
of an alliance of political leadership in both branches to 
oversee the permanent government. Both have a common interest 
in that the political levels in the executive branch share with 
the elected members of congress the task of governing through 
the bureaucracy. By insisting that all executive agreements be 
filed with the appropriate congressional committers, congress is 
responding to the need for assurances that the system of checks 
and balances is still functioning. 
176. THOMAS (Norman C), Presidential accountability since 
Watergate. Presi Stud Quart; 8,4; Fall 1978; 417-34. 
Reveals that the American involvement in Vietnam and 
the Watergate affair spurred efforts by congress to curb executive 
power generally and to strengthen presidential accountability. 
The changes that congress implemented have had greater symbolic 
than operational significance. Most of the presidents powers 
have not been substantially curbed and congress lacks the 
capacity to provide independent institutional leadership to 
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ceunterbalance the presidency in the long run. The complex 
foreign, domestic and economic policy challenges that the US 
faces can only be met effectively through strong presidential 
leadership as long as present constitutional arrangements remain 
in effect, 
177, VALE (Vivian). Obligation to spend: Presidential impoundment 
of congressional appropriations. Pol Stud; 25, 4; Dec 1977; 
508-22. 
States that a recent major controversy has arisen over 
the habitual impoundment of US congressional appropriations by 
the president through the 0MB, President Nixon who made 
unprecedftotly frequent! resort to the practice, claimed both 
constitutional and statutory authority as well as citing 
historical precedent. These claims are successively examined 
and almost wholly rejected. Rather impoundment appears as a 
device whereby president Nixon substituted his own legislative 
priorities for those of thecongress. The latter, therefore 
strictly limited the practice by statute and sought as a 
counterpoise; to improve its own budgetary procedures. This 
recent reform is in turn evaluated and the balance of responsi-
bility as between president and congress in this fiscal area 
is weighed. 
courts: A coiranent on the horizontal effect of the sweeping 
clause. Law and Contemporary Problems; 40, 2; Spr 1976; 
102-34. 
Reveals that there is a reasonable basis for questioning 
the permissive view that the US executive has assumed in respect 
to incidential executive powers. This power is far more dependent 
upon a requirement of congressional detexrmination then has been 
commonly supposed. A textual source of this dependence may rest 
in the relatively unexamined second half of the best known clause 
of the constitution. This clause assigns to congress alone the 
responsibility to say by law what additional authority, if any, 
the executive and courts are to have beyond that core of powers 
that are indispensable to the performance of their express 
duties xinder article 11 and 111 of the constitution. 
179. ZEIDENSTEIN (Harray G), Reassertion of congressional power: 
New Curbs on the president. Polit Sci Quart; 93, 3; Fall, 
1978; 373-409. 
States that between 1972 and 1977, the US congress 
created a battary of legal provisions it can use to restrict 
the presidents independence from congress in national 
emergencies, war, foreign policy. The provisions are described 
according to the nature of the restriction and the specific 
kind of presidential action affected. How might the new restriction 
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shape presidential congressional relations in the future? Three 
scenarios, in order of probability for the near future are 
(1) a more balanced partnership because congressional checks 
on the president will be more frequent and more effective; 
(2) a constitutional confrontation if the president challenges 
the constitutionality of any of the restrictions; (3) under 
certain conditions, a reassertion of dominant presidency in 
the more distant future. 
CONSTITUTION 
180. BARTHOLOMEW (PC). Problem of Presidential disability: A 
summary view. Amer Bar Assoc J; 44, 6; Je 1958; 542-3, 550. 
States that the continuing concern about the presidents 
health raises again the uncertainty about the law applicable 
when a president is disabled by illness. The two main questions 
are: who is to determine the presidents' disability and whether 
Vice 
theipresident succeeds to the office of the president or only 
temporarily to the powers and duties of the office. The consti-
tutional and practical problems raised and several of the 
proposed solutions are discussed. Action in the form of a 
constitutional amendment, should be initiated by the congress to 
solve the problem without further delay. 
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181. FRELINGHUYSEN (P). Presidential Disability. A Amer Acad 
Pol See Sci; 307; Sept 1956; 144-55. 
Describes that when faced with a case of presidential 
disability the question arises as to whether its the powers and 
duties of the presidential office or the office of presidency 
itself that devolves upon the Vice President. The precedent 
ruling a succession, due to the death of the incumbent was that 
after the President had died the Vice President took the oath 
and was recognized as President of the US, i.e. he succeeded 
to the office as well as its powers and duties. But of more 
immediate concern is the construction given to the constitution 
in a case not involving the Presidents' death but his disability, 
The precedent here was that even though a President recovered 
from his disability during his tenure, he could not displace 
the Vice President who had assumed the duties of his office.It 
was this theory that the powers and duties of the Presidency 
were indivisible with the office, which acted as a major deterrent 
to any action designed to clarify the question of Presidential 
disability when President Garfield was shot and when President 
Wilson was striken. 
182. HEINLEIN (JC). Problem of Presidential Inability. Univ 
Cincinnati Law R; 25, 3; Sum 1956; 310-22. 
States that the American constitution provides that if 
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office they shall devolve on the Vice President. But the 
meaning of the provision has never been agreed. There are three 
main;^problems. Who is to determine presidential inability, 
whether the VP becomes full president or acts as President 
temporarily and how the end of the disability is to be recognized. 
The relevent cases of Garfield, Wilson and President Eisenhower 
provide no satisfactory answers. The office of VP should be 
strengthened and the holder encouraged to undertal<e his consti-
tutional responsibility if circumstances demand the continuance 
of executive action without the president. 
183. LACOVARA (Phillip A), Presidential power to gather intelli-
gence: The tension between Art II and Amendment IV. Law and 
Contemporary Problems; 40, 3; Sum 1976? 106-3i. 
Reveals that the use of electronic surveillance to 
gather foreign intelligence involves at least two constitutional 
provisions. One is the pesponsibility of the President of the 
US, as commander in chief to protect the country's national 
security. The other is the fourth amendment which prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures. There is some question 
whether judges have expertise to determine whether electronic 
surveillance is necessary to gather foreign intelligence, but 
there are substantial legal and policy reasons for insisting on 
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judicial warrants. A warrant system will provide additional 
protection for the civil liberties of the targets of surveillance 
and of other persons who may be overheard. In additional a warrant 
system will insure the preparation of a written record fixing 
political accountability for decisions and will require decision 
makers to justify, in a persuasive way, the proposed course of 
action. 
184. MARTIN (WL). Presidential electors:Let the state legislators 
choose them. Amer Bar Assoc J; 44,12; Dec 1958; 1182-87. 
Discusses that various methods for the selection of the 
President and the Vice President were discussed by the constitu-
tional convention in 1787 before it was finally agreed that each 
state should appoint a number of electors equal to the total of 
senators and representatives it sent to congress. The electors 
are appointed by whatever method is choosen in each state. 
185. NOBLEMAN (EE). Delegation of Presidential functions; 
Constitutional and legal aspects. A Amer Acad Polit Soc Sci; 
307; Sept 1956; 134-43. 
Reviews that its well known that presidential office 
carries with it tremendous burdens and of necessity nearly 
every president has relied upon subordinates for the performance 
of many of his duties and the Supreme Court has consistently 
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uphold Presidential delegation of certain functions and duties 
of specified classes of individuals. The delegation device and 
various institutional and staff aids have provided the President 
with some measure of relief. An examination of historical aspects 
and available precedents may provide evidence with respect to 
which of the Presidents' duties may be delegated and the extent 
to which delegation may provide relief from the crushing burdens 
of office. The author next proceeds to review the constitutional 
and legal aspects of the delegation of Presidential functions, 
which clarifies the categories of presidential functions which 
may be delegated 
186. SILVA (RC). Presidential Inability. Univ Detroit Law J; 
35, 2; Dec 1957; 139-73. 
Discusses that the US constitution provides that the 
Vice President shall take over presidential duties during a 
presidents' inability but the precise meaning of this clause 
has always been in doubt and it has never been tested. The 
constitution must be clarified so that the real meaning of the 
inability provision is shown ie. that the Vice President would 
serve as acting president and that he would do so only until 
the president was able to resume his normal duties. Various 
proposals have been made for determining the existence of 
presidential inability. The best course would be for either the 
m 
president or the Vice President to declare the inability and 
for the president himself to declare its termination 
187. SOFAER (Abraham).. Presidency, War and Foreign Affairs: 
Practice under these framers. Law and Contemporary Problems; 
40, 2; Spr 1976; 12-38. 
States that this paper deals with one recurrent use of 
history in the current debate over US institutions. Again and 
again, those critical of recent practices have involved the 
experience of the constitutions' framers. The willingness of the 
first presidents to abide by the constitution has been offered 
as an explanation for the nations progress. Hence an understanding 
of that first experience is crucial for evaluating present 
developments, 
188. WILMERDING . (L Jr), Presidential Inability. Polit Sci Quart; 
72, 2; Je 1957; 161-81. 
Reviews that in the event of the presidents inability 
to discharge his duties the constitution of the US provides 
for the devolution of his authority upon the office of the VP, 
Inability is not specifically defined in the constitution but 
it clearly means incapacity to exercise the presidential office 
through any cause other than deposition, death or resignation, 
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The constitution permits the president to resume office upon 
removal of his inability. The twelfth amendment confirms the 
fact that though a Vice President may act as president, he 
does not thereby become president. The constitution covers all 
contingencies with regard to the presidential inability and no 
amendment is at present required. 
CRITICISM 
189. PIOUS (RM). Is presidential power poison? Polit Sci Quart; 
89, 3; 1974; 627-43. 
Discusses that a critical examination of recent works on 
the US presidential function shows that opinions are generally 
opposed to the idea that the considerable growth of presidential 
power was inevitable and desirable for the functioning of democracy. 
190. SILBERMAN (Laurence H), Toward presidential control of the 
state Department. For Aff; 57, 4; Spr 1979; 872-93. 
Reviews that its inappropriate for foreign seirvice 
officers to occupy senior policy making position in the State 
Department. Such appointments have resulted in repeated conflicts 
between the presidential and the State Department and its also 
fundamentally inconsistent with American democratic theory. So 
long as the foreign service sees itself in competition with 
political appointtees for senior positions, it'll instructively 
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resist presidential direction of the substance of foreign 
policy. In resisting the legitimacy of political appointments 
essential to presidential control, it inevitably rejects as 
well the legitimacy of political directions. 
DIPLOMATS 
191. WATERS (M). Special diplomatic agents of the President. 
A Amer Acad Polit Soc Sci; 307; Sept 1956; 124-33. 
Discusses that the location and extent of authority for 
the conduct of foreign affairs has been a subject of long stand-
ing debate. The author deals with one aspect of that debate, 
the question of the presidents power to use diplomatic agents 
to carry out foreign assignments without restrictions by congress, 
The apponents of this presidential power maintain that such 
appointments can be valid only if the Senate has given its 
consent. Supporters of this argue that the agents are not 
officers of the US, but the mere agents of the president, who 
has utmost freedom regarding his choice of and assignments to 
such men, 
ELECTION 
192. GOSSETT (WT). Electing the president. Nar Civic R; 58,6; 
Je 1969; 241-77. 
R§veals that the president of the American Bar 
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Association discusses the Associations recent efforts to 
reform the electoral college system of presidential election. 
It had defects which the founding fathers had not foreseen 
(1) the hazard that the winner of the popular vote will be 
rejected (ii) the winner take all feature runs rough shoi 
over minorities (iii) by discriminating among voters on the 
baslfC of residence, the value of cotes depends on where they 
are cast; (vi) the college system makes possible a situation 
in which the election of the president would have to be decided 
by the House of Representatives where it would be possible to 
elect a president who had been rejected by a majority of the 
voters (v) presidential electors can legally thwart the will 
of the people, 
EMERGENCY 
193, KLIEMAN (Aaron S). Preparing for the hour of need: The 
National Emergencies Act. Presi Stud Quart; 9, 1; Winter 
1979; 47-65. 
States that according to the national emergencies Act 
a US President is free to declare a state of emergency and to 
weild the requisite powers for a period of upto six months 
or until congress is able to organize and concert its opposition, 
This is time enough to effect basic reforms/ weaken centres 
of opposition, neutralize congress and in other ways inflict 
laa 
serious damage upon the democratic structure. Originally 
designed to increase the power of congress, the Act will 
actually have the effect of increasing the power of the 
president, 
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
195. BRUFF (Harold H), Presidential power and administrative rule 
making. Yale Law Journal; 8, 3; Jan 1979; 451-507. 
Describes that this article defines a role for the US 
President in overseeing administrative rule making the reflects 
the special nature of his office and that compliments the 
oversight roles of congress, the courts and the public. Separation 
of powers principles require limiting presidential power to 
maintain the balance of power among the branches of government 
and the avoid exceeding the institutional competence of the 
presidency. Within substantive statutory limits, the President 
should be able to direct subordinate rule making in some situations 
Presidential power in a particular instance should depend on such 
considerations as whether the nature of the rule-making programe 
is appropriate for presidential intervention, whether procedural 
steps are taken to ensure fairness and whether the other branches 
of government can still exercise their checks on presidential 
power. 
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195, HOBBS (EH). President and Administration - Eisenhower. 
Publ Adm R; 18, 4; Aut 1958; 306-13. 
Describes that a good president must be both a good 
administrator and a good politician. Many substantive policies 
of the Eisenhower regime are carry overs from preceding 
presidents as are many of the presidential institutional aids 
established by Roosevelt and Truman. In contrast to the rapid 
and persistent growth in the presidents personal entourage, 
changes in the institutional staff, specifically the executive 
office of the president, since Truman have been gentle mutations 
and not revolutionary. The hall-marks of the Eisenhower 
Administrations have been the pre-eminence of personal staff 
and the maturing of the white House into a central staff 
directorate, 
196, NATHAN (Richard P). Administrative Presidency. Publ Int; 
44; Sum 1976; 40-54. 
Reveals that executive management has been the ambition 
of recent US Presidents who have tried unsuccessfully to see 
that their directives are carried out. The attempts of Nixon 
are examined against the background of Watergate crisis, an 
event which ultimately defected these efforts to impose 
executive control on the bureaucracy. Examples clearly demons-
trate that decisions rarely achieve execution unless they are 
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in accord with the policy of key directors who head the 
various agencies. Budget reduction, personnel shifts etc 
are the weapons in the executives hands but these are rarely 
effective instruments for accomplishing the designed reforms 
unless at least two years are allowed for their achievement, 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 
197. BAILEY (SK). President and his political executives. 
A Amer Acad Polit Soc Sci? 307; Sept 1956; 24-36. 
Mentions that the executive branch of the federal 
government is a many splintered thing it consists of various 
departments and agencies carrying out a variety of national 
policies. Responsibility for unity of direction resides in the 
president. The problem is that ultimate responsibility may be 
sabotaged by the fact that the president's political executives 
have rarely remained solely and continuously "the presidents 
men", Assxaming various civil service reforms, the ability of 
the president to maximize responsible and flexible control over 
the bureaucracy depends ultimately upon his ability to recruit 
and hold an increasing number of dedicated non-career political 
executives, 
FOREIGN POLICY 
198. COWHEY (Peter F) and LAITIN (David D). Bearing the burden. 
A model of presidential responsibility in foreign policy. 
Int Stud Quart; 22, 2; Je 1978; 267-96, 
Describes that this paper suggests a research strategy 
for resolving two problems in the analysis of US foreign 
policy. One is the question of when and to what degree presidents 
can control the foreign policy apparatus. The other is the 
issue of what types of foreign policy leadership residents 
should exercise within tbe boundaries of their power. In short 
the authors seek to show what the limits are to presidential 
responsibility for foreign policy. After outling an invariable 
obligations to exercise the oversight function, the research 
strategy suggests that the presidential responsibility hinges 
on the nature of the international environment. It distinguishes 
the concept of an international influence structure and an 
international role structure. Thus, the domestic powers and 
responsibilities of the president for a particular foreign 
policy issue depend on the influence and role structure. 
199. PERLMUTTER (A). Political centre and foreign policy. Stud 
Compar Int Develop; 9,3; Fell 1974; 90-102. 
Discusses that in the US as elsewhere the political 
centre has become iiwnensely irt5>ortant in modern times. Its 
dominated by a small group whose power, due to the Great 
Depression, World War II and the Cold War has vastly increased 
in recent decades. The while House, consisting of the President 
and his courtiers, dominates the centre. This court has emerged 
in the absence of a central political party or bureaucracy. The 
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other albeit lesser dominating institution is the senate. 
A consensus only exits in the center 06 foreign policy - security 
and diplomacy. The president and his court are custodians of 
that consensus, 
GETTYSBURG SPEECH 
200. ROELOFS (H Mark). Gettysburg Address: An exercise in 
presidential legitimation. Presi Stud Quart; 8, 3; Sum 
1978; 226-36. 
Reviews ^hat legitimation is the often valid process 
creative of and prior to the formation and use of power. The 
study of legitimation in connection with the American presidency 
has been so neglected that an internal analysis of the 
Gettysberg Address, a probably paradigmatic example of presi-
dential legitimations role playing, may yield concepts and 
patterns of wide utility. The essay closes with a series of 
questions for further research on the legitimation role of 
the American Presidency, 
IMPEACHMENT 
201. ISENBERGH (J). Scope of the power to impeach. Yale Law J; 
84, 6; My 1975; 1316-37. 
States that in the intense controversies of last year 
concerning the impeachment of President Nixon, the prevailing 
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view was that the US constitution limits impeachable offences 
to treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors, 
However, these impeachable offences are not defined in the 
constitution, that high crimes and misdemeanors are an histor-
ically well-defined category of offenses aimed specifically 
against the state, for which removal is mandatory upon 
conviction by the senate; that congress has the power to impeach 
and-remove civil officers for a wide range of serious offences 
other than crimes and misdemeanors and that the senate can 
impose sanctions less severe than removal from office on civil 
officers convicted of such other offenses. 
202. MC WHINNY (Edward). English and the American impeachment 
powers and the constitutional separation of powers. 
Jahrbuch des offentlichen Rechts der Gagenwart; 24; 1975; 
577-92. 
States that the separation of powers under the American 
constitution has never been a static thing with the relationship 
between the three main institutions the presidency, congress 
and the supreyt,court - jelled once and for all in some bygone 
age. There is little doubt that the attempted revival of the 
presidential impeachment power in the US against President Nixon, 
has weakened the institution of the presidency. The attorneys 
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for president Nixon contended that the US constitutional power 
as the impeachment extends only to indicatable crimes and 
cannot be applied to pxirely political acts of the president, 
The shattering of the old constitutional imperative of the fixed 
concurrent, four year Presidential and Vice Presidential terms 
of office may be one of the unexpected dividends of the 25th 
Amendment to the constitution, 
LEADERSHIP 
203. CLAYTON :(Ross) and LAMMERS (VVilliam) , Presidential 
leadership reconsidered? Contemporary views of top 
federal officials. Presi Stud Quart; 8, 3; Sum 1979; 
237-45. 
A portrait of personal character traits and political 
sMlls requisite to effective presidential leadership in the 
US is extracted from the responses of thirty-one top level 
Federal Official to a questionnaire administered in May 1977. 
Important personal qualities of presidents identified by these 
respondents include: flexiblity, political courage, intelligence, 
vision, self-confidence, coirparison, sincerity, sense of 
humour, lack of variety and absence of extreme partisanship. 
Ability to relate to congress and knowledge of political 
realities were key interactive skills. Electoral relations were 
seen to be particularly affected by a president's timing in 
taking positions on public issues and by his ability to maintain 
public trust and confidence in his honesty. 
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204. COOPER (J) and BOMBARDIER (G). Presidential leadership 
and party success. J Polit; 30, 4; Nov 1968; 1012-27. 
Describes that a comparison of roll call votes on key 
issues in the 87th and 89th congresses reveals that president 
Johnson enjoyed a significantly higher level of legislative 
success in the House of Representatives than president Kennedy, 
The explanation lies in the increase in the number of liberal 
Northern Democrates rather than in any increase in party 
cohesions since the latter remained at almost exactly the 
same level in the 89th as in the 87th congress, 
205. NEUMANN (Robert G), Leadership: Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, 
Eisenhower and today. Presi Stud Quart; 10, 1; Wint 1980; 
10-19, 
Reveals that the presidency of the US is perhaps the 
only position in the world whose responsibilities are fare 
greater then its power. Few constitutional and statutory 
prerogatives of the president can be exercised by him alone, 
that ifi without congressional cooperation. Leadership, therefore 
has to be exercised in the gap between the presidents constit-
utional and statutory powers on the one hand and his responsi-
bilities to inspire, to manage diverse political and popular 
support for his policies and objectives. This has been called 
the mystery of the presidency in the sense that it defies 
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logical explanation because its infinitely varied. The 
president can lead public opinion but only in so far as he's 
not too far ahead. A president to be effective must project 
a broadly felt/ indefinable impression that lies in change. 
A president must be able to lead his numerous constituencies, 
Roosevelt had all those criteria, Truman did well despite 
many setbacks and Eisenhower was greatly admired during his 
lifetime, then disparaged, but recently has emerged again as 
a strong and skillful president. 
206. ODEGARD (PH). Presidential leadership and party responsibility. 
A Amar Acad Polit Soc Sci; 307; Sept 1956? 66-81. 
Describes that the office of the Presidency possess 
great powers, but if an administration is to succeed there 
must be good relations between the president and the congress. 
In contrast to the British system, the parochial tendencies in 
congress place a premium on diversity, on independence not only 
of the president but also of the party organisations of which 
the president is the formal leader. In these circumstances its 
difficult to know which party is really responsible for any 
given policy and unless he can pick up considerable support 
from the opposition party, the average president will see his 
policies fail stable and effective government today requires 
greater unity in a major parties. Ifcs necessary to look to the 
President if it is to be achieved, 
m 
207, QUADRE (QL). Presidential leadership: paralysed or 
irresponsible? Pari Aff; 17, 1; Wint 1963-4; 65-76. 
Mentions that the contradictory criticisms of the 
American presidency - paralysed or irresponsible are often 
seen as mutually exclusive; what this article proposes to 
show is that both positions are correct and furthermore that 
the conditions they reflect derive primarily from the same 
source. This source is the peculiarities and maladies of the 
American system of government with its separation of powers 
and checks and balances. This system has three consequences -
it tends to destroy the possibility of the public assessing 
and pin pointing political responsibility, the president can 
often do np more then a recalcitrant congress will permit, 
policies which do eventuate often lack cohesion. In crisis 
congress understands (l) the need for action, its own inadequacy 
for action and is inclined to become a rubber stamp reluctant 
to impede the executive. Thus the American system tends in 
fiormal times to ineffectiveness; in time of crisis, when the 
built in restraints vanish no others like their place, hence 
irresponsibility, 
208. SELIGMAN (LG). Presidential leadership: The inner circl8 
and institutionalization. J Polit; 18, 3; Aug 1956; 410-26. 
Reveals that inner circles play a role in the innovations 
H4 
and new departiores of the Presidential leadership. These in 
time have become a generally accepted institution and attenpts 
have been made to build them up into a regular presidential 
staff. It would seem that congress prefers to maintain the 
autonomy of the extremities by limiting the president and his 
staff. Its doubtful if congress alone can make a presidency by 
staff. It takes the president's self-abnegation to do that, 
Hence the president who interprets his role as leading and 
responding to public expectations of leadership must resist any 
attempts to define the personnel of his staff and relations to 
it. Its the demise of leadership to become itself completely 
organized, 
209. SELIGMAN (LG). Presidential office and the president as 
party leader. Law and Contemporary Problem* 
Mentions that the presidents' role as national leader 
has expanded more rapidly then his function as party leader, 
Changes in the relative power of federal, state and local 
governments has influenced party organization. The present 
system of presidential press and public relations which has 
become increasingly important, was established by Roosevelt, 
It emphasizes the dual mandate of the president, who is both 
the leader of his party and "above party" as national leader. 
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LIMITATIONS 
210. BAILEY (Harry A Jr), Administration process approach to 
constraining the American presidency. Presi Stud Quart; 
8, 3; Sura 1978; 268-75. 
Discusses that the abuses of presidential power during 
the Nixon era has led to a reexamination of the necessity for 
exceptional executive power. All of these proposals would 
restrict presidential power or make it more accountable. None 
of these pi>Dposals, however focus on a more useful reform - one 
from the view point of administration as process. What is 
proposed in an administrative process approach to the problem 
of presidential aggrandizement and abuse of executive branch 
organization domains need to be identified, the limits of their 
authority defined, the circumstances under which their authority 
becomes operative spelled out, and the processes which surround 
each act of authority in each of the organisations clarified. 
211. BERGER (Harriet F), Appointment and confirmation to the 
National labour Relations Board: Derjjocratic Constraints 
on Presidential Power? Presi Stud Quart; 8, 4; Fall 1978; 
403-17. 
States that presidential appointments to NLRB raise 
the questions of whether the parties are really interested in 
H^ ^ 
in high Calibre, non-political appointments free from Clientele 
and partisan pressures and whether they are willing and able 
to take the steps together that will furnish the country with 
qualified personnel on NLRB as well as the more prominent 
regulatory agencies and in the other branches of the government, 
Recent confirmation hearings have been characterized by their 
perfunctory natxure, 
212. LEA (JF) , Presidency: Axixilary and primary limits. 
Southern Quart; 14, 2; Jan 1976; 133-49. 
States that confronted with the question of how best to 
deal with the problem of the US presidency its found that 
campaign reform, the Watergate committee recommendations and 
the budget and war powers legislation simply will not suffice. 
All these are necessary but will not alone permit sufficient 
limits to be {ilaced on the potentially catastrophic concent-
ration of powers in the presidency. A thorough cultural and 
political reorientation must precede any lasting redistribution 
of power in our society. The simultaneous decline of religious 
faith and politiclzation of life confers on politics the aura 
of religion, with the president as high priest. All this is 
magnified by apathy. 
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213. NEUSTADT (RE), Constraining of the president: The 
Presidency after Watergate, Brit J Polit Sci; 4, 4; Oct 
1974; 383-97. 
Discusses that the modern presidency's past and prospects 
are bound up with the questions. What was prudence made of? 
wTiat became of those ingredients etc. A generation ag<w^the 
American systems formal checks and balances were strongly 
reinforced by an army of informal constraints on white House 
conduct. These were operational constraints tied to working 
conditions. Some were external, irqsosed on the white House, 
equally affecting president and staff. Others were internal. 
External constraints reflected his dependence upon men whom 
he could not control for work he wanted done, 
214, POLSBY (Nelson W), Critical introduction. Law and Contemp-
orary Problem; 40, 2; Spr 1976; 3-11, 
Describes that the presidency of Nixon is currently 
the great storehouse of illustrations that students invoke 
in aid of arguments concerning the need to constrain the 
presidency. In this introductory article the author sets down 
the arguments for and against the limitations of presidential 
power. His major concern is to provide a historical background 
14« 
for the discussion of presidential power and to caution 
against a hasty limitation of presidential authority without 
due attention to constitutional history. 
215. SIREVAG (T), Limits of US presidential power. Interna-
sional Politikk; 1973; 245-60. 
Describes that debating the various constitutional 
limitations on presidential power, the article nevertheless 
focuses on political limitations. Just as the presidents' 
real power rests with his ability to persuade and cajole 
along the people, so his power will be limited by popular 
approval or disapproval. The very strength of the congressional 
committee and seniority system, rather than limit presidential 
initiative and activism, has ironically served rather to push 
the president toward arbitrary actions and the usurpation of 
a power he can retain as long as he has popular backing. 
LYNDON JOHNSON 
216, HOROWITZ (IL). Lyhdon Baines Johnson and the rise of 
presidential militarism. Soc Sci Quart? 53, 2; Sept 1972; 
395-402. 
Reviews that the author focuaes upon the dtkality of roles 
between Johnson as the master domestic tactician and the misguided 
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military tactician. Those factors which made him excil at the 
one made him fail in the other. Some of these role conflicts 
may be inherent in the presidential role but they were especially 
evident in a liberal democratic regime. 
217. LOWI (TJ). One dimensional president: Lyndon Johnson's 
vantage point. Soc Sci Quart; 53, 2; Sept 1972; 409-16. 
States that LBJs book is an accurate description of 
the man and his administration. It exhibits both the merits 
and shortcomings of the institution of the presidency and 
also high lights the ridiculously high expectations which both 
masses and elites hold about the possibilities of political 
change emanating from the White House. The Johnson's years 
were full of nothing but the highest priorities. It was the 
admixture of highest priorities and expectations that was the 
great limitation of Johnson as president, 
NIXON, RICHARD, FRES 
218. ALBUM (Michael J), Government control of Richard, Nixon's 
presidential material. Yale Law Journal; 87, 8; Jly 1978; 
1601-36. 
States that this note attempts to define ex-President 
Nixon's first and foxirth Amendment rights in his presidential 
m 
material. These constitutional claims will limits the govern-
ments' ability to screwn and retain the material seized under 
the Act. Part 1 of the note examines the past treatment of 
presidential material and the provisions of the Presidential 
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act. Part II proposes a 
scheme for categorizing presidential material and develops a 
framework for determining the constitutionally protected 
interests inherent in the various categories of material. 
Part III applies this frame work to an analysis of the regul-
ations implementing the Act, The note concludes with an examin-
ations of the provisions of proposed legislation dealing with 
government ownership and retention of presidential material. 
219. BALFOUR (N). Presidential Nixon's second term. Wld Today; 
29,3; March 1973; 98-107. 
Mentions that Vietnam is out of the last but America 
faces pressing international, trading and monetary, as well as 
domestic, problems while decision making is increasingly 
concentrated in the white House, the confrontation with congress 
will make 1973 a difficult year for the president. 
220. COLE (Richard L) and CAPUTO (David A). Presidential control 
of the senior civil service: Assessing the strategies of 
the Nixon years. Amer Polit Sci Rev; 72, 2; Je 1979; 377-413< 
Discusses that modern presidents must be attentive to 
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influence of the federal bioreaucracy on their policy initiatives 
and all attempt some measure of bureaucratic control. This 
article assess the extent of president Nixon's success in gaining 
some degree of management control over the bureaucracy through 
the manipulation of the civil service personel system. The authors 
find that Republicans werp, in fact more likely to be selected 
to top career positions during the Nixon year. This is significant 
to presidential control because of the large number of bureauc-
rates calling themselves independents, 
PEACE 
221. BUNDY (Mc G). Preisdency and the peace. For Aff? 42, 3; 
Apr 1964; 353-65, 
Describes that the American presidency has become the 
world's best hope of preventing nuclear war and the presidents' 
most effective power is that of commander-in-chief. As important 
as strength is being known to have it, A president who seeks 
peace must have a clear view of the USSR? must be firm against 
pressure, but ready for settlements of differences. The cuban 
crisis - the most important event of the Kennedy Presidency -
was the first direct test between USA and Russia in which 
nuclear weapons were the issue. The office of President as well 
as the men was embodied in the resolution restraint and respon-
sibility of those weeks. The test ban treaty that followed, in 
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which the presidency was central, proved America's readiness 
to work for a safer prospect of survival. In this case, as in 
many other instances. Presidency can become in instrument of 
hope for men everywhere, 
POLICY MAKING 
222. GEWIRTZ (Paul). Courts, Congress and Executing policy 
making: Notes on three doctrines. Law and Contemporary 
Problems; 40, 3; Sum 1976; 46-85. 
States that the US Congress has lost much of its policy 
making power to the executive. As a result of executive makes 
major policy which has not been affirmatively endorsed by 
congress. Against the background of frequent arguments that 
congress's role in policy making should be strengthened and 
protected to assure an appropriate allocation of power in our 
system, the author considers whether the courts should play some 
role in furthering that objective. 
223. LELOUP (Lance T) and SHULL (Steven A). Congress is the 
Executive: the "two presidencies" reconsidered. Soc Sci 
Quart; 59, 4; Mr 1979; 407-19. 
Reveals that authors re-examine wilderslings assertion 
that the foreign policy presidency is significantly more power-
ful than the domestic policy presidency. Updating the data on 
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presidential requests to congress and subdividing into various 
domestic policy areas, the results show foreign policy less 
distinctive than before 1965 and subject to some of the same 
variations. Reviewing the broader changes in the relationship 
between congress and the president/ its concluded that the 
president remains stronger in foreign policy despite the 
blending that has occurred. 
224. SCHILLING (WR). H Bomb Decision. How to Decide without 
Actually Choosing. Polit Sci Quart; 76, 1; Mar 1961; 24-46. 
On January 31st, 1950 President Truman ordered the 
Atomic Energy Commission to continue its efforts to determine 
the technical feasibility of a thermo-nuclear weapon and the 
Department of State and Defence were asked to re-examine 
national strategic objectives and plans in the light of expected 
Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities. These article contrasts 
the presidents decision with the preceding policy discussions, 
attempts to explain the minimal character of that decision and 
indicates some of the policy consequences that followed from 
the nature of the way in which the decision was made. The 
decision is seen as a story of international politics affording 
a classic example of the traditional security dilemma. 
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225. SEUGMAN (Lester G), Presidency and political cleanage. 
Ann Amer Acad Pol Soc Sci; 466; Mr 1983; 179-92. 
Reveals that at a time when the US President is attempt-
ing a drastic change in economic policy/ its appropriate to 
examine the development of his role in economic policy. President 
Roosevelt expanded the presidents' role as economic policy 
maker in the an unchallenged executive response to the crisis 
of the depression. The institutionalization of that vote was 
a process involving several stages that unfolded in succeeding 
administrations. The importance of CEA contributed to a train 
of economic policy staff agencies that grew as the presidents 
economic policy role expanded with the emergence of such problems 
as economic growth, poverty, inflation, stagflation etc, 
226. SULLIVAN (RR). Role of presidency in shaping, lower level 
policy making processes. Polity; 3, 2; 1970; 201-21. 
Reveals that the paper's focus is on« temporary political 
office holder. The president of the United State. The central 
conclusion is that four past President have and future Presidents 
may influence low level policy making in three related ways. 
First is periodic direct Presidential intervention. Second, is 
intervention through a special assistant and thirii^ y continuous 
direct intervention is assayed and judged most efficient 
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politically because it involves more of the Presidents' time 
and does not risk his reputation. 
227. THOMAS (NC). Presidential advice and information: Policy 
and program formulation. Law and Contemporary Problems; 
35, 3; 1970; 540-72. 
Discusses that the President can provide leadership and 
direction in those policy areas that he regards as important, 
but only if he has secured the needed advice and information, 
Presidential advice and information should be as wide ranging 
as possible and that it should encompass diverse social, 
economic and political perspectives. 
228. VAN DER SLIR (Jack R). President in a paradigm of policy 
making. Presi Stud Quart; 9, 1; Wint 1979; 65-71. 
Describes that President carter has actively engaged in 
both policy formulation and policy promotions. But in doing so 
he has had considerable difficulty with key members of the 
congress. These difficulties especially with majority party 
members, perhaps reveal more about the extent to which the 
chambers have institutionalized decentralization and speciali-
zation then they do about personal shortcomings in carter and 
the congressional leaders. 
i5e 
PRESS 
229. BONE (HA). Presidential press conference. Pari Aff; 
11, 2; Spr 1958; 142-54. 
Reveals that Theodore Roosevelt originated this unique 
institution. Wilson regularized the press conferences and 
Roosevelt elevated them to a major device of leadership and 
communication, Eisenhower permitted a full recording af a 
conference to be broad cast, which virtually negates the rule 
that the president cannot be quoted directly without his permi-
ssion. The regular meetings between the reporters and the chief 
executive have become a part of the American system of government 
and a means by which a president speaks to the world. The news 
conference has given the president an additional tool of leader-
ship, and a channel through which he influences public opinion. 
2230. CORNWELL (EE). President and the press? Phases in the 
relationship. Ann Amer Acad Pol Soc Sci? 427; Sept 1976 
53-64. 
Describes that the article approaches the relationship 
of the US president to the press first by discussing the key 
importance of the president's ability to develop public support 
for his policies. This is his primary reliance since he has 
few constitutional powers for influencing policy and his role 
as party leader is not much help. Because the presidents 
15^ 
relationship with the public is so important, his dependence 
on the press to maintain that link is very great, A presidents' 
relations With the press, though based on inter-dependence, 
rarely involve cordial cooperation. How wisely he uses this 
key asset in efforts to influence policy and how skilfully 
he deals with the media will determine much of his presidency's 
success, 
231. CORNWELL (EE Jr), Presidential Press Conference: A Study 
institutionalization. Mid West J Polit Sc; 4, 4; Nov 1960; 
370-89. 
The presidential press conference has rapidly developed 
in the last two decades from a highly informal semi-private 
encounter between the chief executive and reporters into a 
formalized public institution. The "mediating" role performed 
by the reporters between president and public has diminished. 
Now the president speaks directly to the public from this forum, 
Institutionalization has not substantially reduced the usefulness 
of the conference as measured by front page news in the New 
York Times thus generated. It may have reduced its usefulness 
in terms of some of the more subtle benefits to be reaped by 
the president from intimated contact with reporters. The 
institutionalized press conference may well be less dependent 
upon accidental factors of personality than in past. 
J5^ 
<132. RESTON (JB) . Press, the President and foreign policy. 
For Aff; 44, 4; Jly 1966; 553-73. 
States that the clash of theory and reality of news 
making and reporting, shows most in the application of American, 
Constitutional theory to the conduct of American foreign policy, 
The clash is that between the people's right to be informed and 
the governments' obligation to govern effectively. Where lies 
the greater danger to the public interest in the presCl^rt 
power of the press or of the president? The presidents' power 
has increased enormously since World V7ar II; the press may 
report news, the President makes it; he has the initiative 
over press and congress, 
PUBLIC OPINION 
233, SIGEL (RS). Image of the American presidency - Part II of 
an exploration into popular views of presidential power. 
Midwest J Polit Sci; 10, 1; Feb 1966; 123-37. 
Reviews that how do ambivalent attitudes towards power 
affect the American's voters' image of the Presidency and 
Presidential leadership? A public opinion survey conducted in 
Michigan confirmed the hypothesis that the public admires a 
strong man, with problem solving abilities, a man who would 
prevail over congress, if necessary. While a majority of 
159 
respondents would like to see the President exercise considerable 
power -• they also felt that presidential power should be curbed 
by a time limit lest it lead to excesses. The 22nd Amendment 
is illustrative^this sentiment. 
RESEARCH 
234, HAYES (Stephen L). Presidential support among Senatorial 
leaders and followers, Amer Pol Quart; 12, 2; Aug 1984; 
195-207. 
States that the research examines the differences 
between US Senate party leaders and rank and file party members 
on a measure of support for the President of their party. The 
expectation is that party leaders give presidents' of their 
party greater support then do non-leaders. 
SENATE 
235. NIGRO (PA). Buren Confirmation before the Senate. West 
Polit Quart; 14, 1; Mar 1961; 148-59. 
Discusses that partisan motives are involved in any 
senate action on a presidential appointment. The presidents' 
followers support him, largely out of party loyalty. Where 
there is an opening for successful attack, the opposition 
senators fight the chief executive's appointments, again 
160 
largely for partisan reasons. However, in some cases, the 
fundamental issue is one which cuts across party iines; such 
cases cannot be dismissed as partisan reasons. However, in some 
cases, the fundamental issue is one which cut across the party 
lines; such cases cannot be dismissed as partisan joints 
between Republicans and Democrats, and vice versa. At the 
same time, it would be inaccurate to give the impression that 
partisan factors are involved only to a very minor extent in 
controversies over high presidential appointments. The cases of 
Martin ven Buren illustrates very well how the senate's action 
can be based exclusively on such considerations. Fortunately, 
the Van Buren case also shows how such a gross misuse of the 
senate's power to confirm can boomerang, 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
236. NEUSTADT (RE). Staffing the presidency - The role of 
White House agencies, Ind J Pub Adm; 8, 3; Jly 1962J. 
270-81. 
Reviews that the American system of government is 
presidential with separated branches sharing powers but one 
of the powers shared by the president and the congress is 
authority over administrative departments. Given the native 
separatism of departments, lacking collective responsibility 
for cabinet officers without cohesion amongst civil servants, 
16tl 
the USA has build up its central organs of coordination and 
control around the one Executive official who has comprehensive 
duties and authority - the President, This approach rests on 
a realistic notion of the nature of a government where 
separated institutions share each others powers. It recognizes 
the final dependence upon presidential judgement. 
STAFF 
237. IRISH (MD). Organization man in the presidency. J Polit; 
20, 2; My 1958; 259-77. 
Discusses that the professional public relations 
ejcperts have been mainly responsible for changing the character 
of the American President from a vigorous political leader to 
a popular figure above politics.. They have been appointed in 
large numbers to White House posts, and occupy some of the 
highest positions of economic and political power. Whilst the 
publicity specialists have been building up the personality of 
the President, the adminstrative managers have been more 
concerned with improving the machinery of the executive office. 
Appointments by the President to his personal staff are not 
subject to senatorial confirmation although his advisors, 
especially his personal assistant, are in practice, left free 
to exercise considerable powers. The abdication of the president 
from the role of political leader leaves America with no 
responsive or responsible head of government. 
16^ 
SUPREME COURT, NOMINATION 
238.MASSARO (John). "Lame-duck" Presidents, great justice. 
Presi Stud Quart; 8, 3; S\m 1918j 296-302. 
"Lame-duck" Presidents tend to appoint to the US Supreme 
Court justice.of higher quality when those named by non-lame-
duck presidents. The lame duck status of a president produces 
a "threat situation" in which the chances of senate rejection 
of his supreme court nominations increases. In order to offset 
this political disadvantage and to gain senate approval of their 
nominees, Lame-Luck President ten^ to seek out supreme coiart 
nominees who possess an unusual degree of legal ability and a 
marked potential for greatness. It is simply a wise political 
move to turn to quality in a threat situation. Because "Lame-
duck" presidents are a typically concerned with their nominees 
'legal competence and ability', it is not surprising that more 
of their appointees go on the greatness on the supreme court 
then do the designees of non-Lame-duck presidents, 
239. TANENHAUS (J) . Sx:5)reme Court and Presidential power. 
A Amer Acad Polit Soc Sci? 307; Sept 1956; 106-13. 
Reveals that on April 8, 1952, President Truman, in 
order to forestall a strike which he felt would imperil national 
defence and UN's action in Korea, directed his secretary of 
IBS 
Commerce "to take possession of and operate" most of the nations 
steel mills. In the absence of statutory authorization for his 
seizure order, the chief executive relied on his powers under 
Article II of the constitution. This move touched off a hotly 
contested constitutional debate as to whether the president was 
restricted to those powers specifically granted to him by the 
constitution and laws. The president normally possess only those 
powers specifically granted to him to the constitution and laws. 
He can exercise prerogative in time of grave emergency, however, 
if congress acquiesces. 
SURVEY 
240. HESS (RD) and EASTON (D), Child's changing image of the 
president. Publ Opin Quart; 24, 4; Wlnt I960; 632-44. 
The process of socialization in areas of life of the 
young child which are regarded as age-inappropriate has been 
left relatively unexplored. This study is concerned with the 
developmental aspects of political socialization of the elementary 
school age child towards one aspect of the American political 
structxire the image of the president of the United States. It 
was conducted in a middle-class suburb of Chicago, by means 
of a questionnaire cen^r&d around the president's personal and 
moral qualities, his role competence, and on information about 
him. The responses to the questionnaire show a highly positive 
image of the president, and Indicate the importance of pre-hlgh-
m^ 
school period as a time during which the process of political 
socialization proceeds. The natiire of developnental change in 
the level of response shows that the second major step in the 
process of socialization with regard to political figure is 
role specification. 
TREATIES 
241. HENKIN (Louis). Litigating the presidents' power to terminate 
treaties. Amer J Int Law; 73, 4; Oct 1979; 647-54. 
Discusses that in recent years individual members of the 
US Congress have gone to court to challenge presidential actions 
as beyond his constitutional power. These cases have raised 
issues as to whether these plaintiffs have the kinds of interests 
that give them standing in court and whether the substantive 
issues, they raise are justifiable or political questions. Powers 
to terminate a treaty would seem to be implied in the character 
of the presidents' office as it has developed. Congress might 
press for a role where termination of a treaty would implicit 
congress's power over war and peace. And perhaps the senate, 
as a condition of its consent to a particular treaty, can 




242. BEST (Judith A). Item veto: Would the Founders approve? 
Presi Stud Quart; 14, 2; Spr 1984; 183-88. 
Mentions that although there is no evidence that the 
Foxanders considered an item veto for the US President, analysis 
of the founders intentions indicates that they would approve 
of some form of item veto. The veto is an integral part of the 
separation of powers. Its defined purposes are to preserve the 
independence of the executive and to prevent the passage of 
bad laws. To accomplish these purposes, the fovmders chose a 
qualified veto thus institutionalizing reconsideration as part 
of the ordinary law making process. Because current legislative 
practice subvertSv^ fehe reconsideration process, its fair to 
conclude that the founders would approve of a reform that 
restores the veto to its original and indispensable function, 
243. DUMBRELL (John W)and LESS (John D), Presidential pocket 
veto power: constitutional anachronism. Polit Stud; 28, 1; 
Mr 1980; 109-16. 
Discusses that the possibility of using the power of 
pocket veto was particularly attractive to the Nixon Administ-
ration, concerned to halt domestic spending programmes voted 
by congress, since the pocket veto is an absolute veto not 
subject to possible override. The administrations interpretation 
USB 
of the pocket veto power, was highly controversial in that it 
was claimed that it would apply to intera-sessional congressional 
recesses. .The protest and litigation surrounding the pocket 
veto of the family practice of Medicine bill, highlighted the 
anachronistic nature of the pocket veto provision. 
244, FISHER (Louis). Political context for legislative vetoes. 
Polit Sci Quart; 93, 2; Sum 1978; 241-54. 
Mentions that several hundred statutory provisions 
currently require the American President and executive agencies 
to report administration proposals to congress with the under-
standing that the congress may disapprove the intended action. 
In most cases, the president must obtain congressional approval 
within a specified number of days. Depending on the statute, 
congressional action can take the forms of one or both Houses, 
but whatever the procedure, these legislative actions are not 
presented to the president for his signature or veto. This 
article analyses legislative vetoes that can be accommodated 
and in adjudicatory issues, 
245, LEE (JR), Presidential vetoes from Washington to Nixon, 
J Polit; 37, 2; My 1975; 522-96. 
Mentions that the study employs multiple regression to 
analyse historical patterns of presidential vetoes and congre-
ssional overriding. One basic finding in that both the frequency 
16S^  
of vetoes and success of congressional effort to override are 
largely responsible to congressional experience of a president 
and objective changes in the political situation. Over 40 
percent of variance in the presidential vetoes is accountable 
for previous congressional membership of the president, party, 
control of the congress and degree of electoral support whereas 
variance in overriding actions is significantly accounted for 
by party control, midterm election, economic stability etc. 
246. RINGELSTEIN (Albert C). Presidential vetoes: Motivation 
and Classification. Congress and the presidency; 12, 1? 
Spr 1985; 43-55. 
Reveals that for all its importance, comparatively few, 
empirically based studies have centered on the US presidential 
veto and virtually none have sought to classify vetoes by 
presidential motivation or policy area. This article updates 
and confirms the major findings of extent studies and suggests 
one important to the conclusions of older research, the 
categories of and reasons for presidential vetoes are remarlc-
ably similar from president to president, independent of party, 
247. VOSE (CE). Memorandum pocket veto. J Polit; 26, 2; May 1964; 
397-405. 
Discusses that pocket veto, or silent refusal by a 
president to sign a bill into law, was replaced in 1934 by the 
practice of appending presidential memoranda to xmsigned bills 
explaining the reasons for withholding endorsement. However, 
study of historical practice reveals that between the first 
vetoes by Madison in 1812 and the Grant Administration« in 
nearly every instance, presidents issued explanations of their 
disapproval of the bill. Since 1939, veto practices have been 
affected by the assignment to the office of legislative Reference 
the responsibility for analysing and coordinating departmental 
advice on proposed legislation. Comparison of recommendations 
with resulting action shows that the president usually follows 
the advice of the office. The pocket veto does remain a 
potentially absolute weapon of the executive; however, its 
utility has been diminished by the tendency of congress to remain 
in session almost all year, thus reducing the risk of end of 
session vetoes. 
WAR 
248. ALLISON (Graham T), Making War: the President and Congress. 
Law and Contemporary Problems; 40, 3; Sum 1976; 86-105. 
Reveals how does the allocation of war making authority 
between the US President and congress affect the outcome of 
such decisions? The constitutional system of checks abd balances 
implies an ongoing process of checking and balancing that is 
nm 
the legal allocation of war powers must be seen in its full 
political context. That context was profoundly altered by the 
trauma of Vietnam which fostered a new effort to redress the 
balance between the President and the congress. That effort 
produced the war powers Resolution in 1973, Had it been in 
effect during the Vietnam conflict, the resolution would not 
have altered the decision to go the war, but it would likely 
have led to a more rapid escalation of the war, while further 
polarizing domestic opinion. Its effects on future decision 
making are more speculative but it'll probably have its intended 
effect, strengthen-ing executive congressional consultation 
before the nations troops are committed to battle. 
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 
249. BULMER (C) and CARMICHAEL (JL). War powers resolution a 
limitation on presidential power? GPSA7 3, 2; 1975; 53-68. 
Reveals that the war powers resolution passed by the 
US congress in November 73 over riding the president veto is 
a major development as congress seeks to restrain the presidents 
war making powers. However, the resolution poses several 
questions: will it conflict with US treaty obligation? Will it 
unconstitutionally limit the presidents prerogatives in foreign 
affairs? Finally, is the provision for the use of a concurrent 
resolution to require the president to withdraw troops before 
the specified 60 days time limit for commitment to troops 
constitutional? The resolution is challenged may not withstand 
scrutiny by the US Supreme Court nevertheless it should be a 
warning to Presidents to consult with congress and the president 
will be reluctant to act unless congress clearly supports him, 
250, THOMSON (HC). War powers resolution of 1973: Can congress 
make it stick? Wld Aff; 139, 1; Sum 1976; 3-9, 
Mentions that in 1973 the US Congress possessed a 
resolution over President Nixon's veto to limit the Presidents' 
power to maintain troops in combat areas overseas. The president 
must withdraw the troops within 60 days if congress does not 
declare war - or sooner if congress s6 directs by passing a 
concurrent resolution. Strong arguments have been made both 
for and against the constitutionality of the resolution, 
Proponents of the resolution have hailed it as a reassertion 
of congressional control over th§ presidents power to wage war, 
Opponents have contended that it actually gives the president 
a blank check to wage war for 60 days without approval by 
congress. If congress can make the resolution stick the balance 
of power between the two branches will be significantly altered, 
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